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Abstract 
This dissertation studies the hospital markets in Pennsylvania from three different 
perspectives. The first chapter examines the consequences of hospital entry in the 
Pennsylvania cardiac surgery market, which experienced substantial entry after the 
Certificate of Need (CON) state regulation was repealed in 1996. Results suggest that 
hospital entry was associated with increased surgery rates. The consequent increase in 
total costs, however, was offset by the fact that entry led to significantly lower cost per 
surgery and slightly improved patient outcomes. A welfare analysis implies that free 
entry in the Pennsylvania cardiac surgery market was welfare improving.  
The second chapter investigates the influence of local medical resources on racial 
disparities in surgery use. The study documents the incidence of the use of coronary 
artery bypass graft (CABG) and percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) procedures 
among Medicare patients who were initially diagnosed with acute myocardial infarction 
(AMI) from 1995 through 2006. A multilevel statistical analysis reveals that, conditional 
on individual characteristics, black patients were more likely to live in counties with 
lower CABG rates and higher PCI rates for both black and white populations. 
Consequences of inadequate medical resources may be particularly exacerbated for 
blacks, compared with whites. 
The third chapter explores the reasons for an observed positive relationship 
between hospital procedure volume and surgical outcomes. Results from multivariate 
logistic regressions show that patients being treated by high-volume surgeons have lower 
risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality than those treated by low-volume surgeons, regardless 
of the procedure volume of admission hospital. These results imply that under the 
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national trend of decreasing hospital CABG volumes, more attention should be paid to 
build the volume of operating surgeons with the goal of ensuring surgical quality in low-
volume CABG hospitals.
9 
 
1 The Welfare Effects of Free Entry: Evidence from the Pennsylvania 
Cardiac Care Market 
1.1 Introduction 
Economists typically believe that free entry, although desirable to consumers, can 
lead to social inefficiency (Chamberlin 1933; Spence 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; 
Mankiw and Whinston 1986). In a free-entry market, firms continue to enter the market 
as long as their accrued profits exceed the cost of entry, failing to recognize that part of 
their business is stolen from existing firms. In the extreme case where new products are 
perfect substitutes of existing products, the marginal entrant creates zero welfare while it 
adds fixed set-up costs, causing social welfare to decline. On the other hand, if new 
products are imperfect substitutes for existing products, entry will introduce more product 
variety, causing social welfare to rise. In general, whether free-entry is socially efficient 
depends on the extent to which entry expands market demand or increases product 
differentiation.  
This paper studies the welfare impact of entry in the cardiac surgery market in 
Pennsylvania, where entry occurred rapidly following the repeal of Certificate of Need 
(CON) regulation in 1996. An issue central to debate over CON policy is that although 
hospital competition may be beneficial to consumers, the substantial costs of hospital 
setting up intensive beds and building new facilities can exceed the benefits of 
competition, causing entry to be socially wasteful. Another concern stems from the 
potential volume-outcome effect widely documented in the literature of health care 
(Birkmeyer, Siewers et al. 2002; Birkmeyer, Stukel et al. 2003; Shahian 2004). It is less 
10 
 
considered, however, about whether entry affects aggregate demand and differentiation 
by hospitals. Rises in the supply of surgeries may expand the market demand via 
increasing access to surgery, affecting the referral recommendation patterns, and 
lowering barriers to care for sicker patients. Additional social benefits may arise from an 
enlarged choice set of hospitals, shorter travel distances for treatments (spatial 
differentiation), and better matches of patients to hospitals (quality differentiation). The 
extent of spatial and quality heterogeneity in hospital markets suggests that, a free-entry 
policy, at least in theory, is likely to be welfare improving. Consideration of these market 
responses to entry may substantially alter the conclusion on the welfare impact of CON 
policy.  
To study the welfare impact of entry, I first estimate a hospital-choice model that 
captures the impact of individual characteristics, hospital quality and travel distances on 
the hospital admission decision. Using the parameter estimates obtained from the 
hospital-choice model, I predict the market share held by cardiac surgery programs that 
opened after the repeal of CON. An attractive feature of this approach is that hospitals are 
not constrained in any pre-defined geographic markets, making the estimated entrant 
share uncorrelated with unobservable patient preferences which potentially cause 
endogeneity problems. I then exploit the variation in entrant market share to quantify the 
market-expansion and the business-stealing effects. I further explore the impact of entry 
on patient outcomes and surgery costs. Finally, I examine how the entry of new surgery 
programs affects hospital differentiation from three aspects at the hospital level: the 
average patients’ traveling distance for treatment, the dispersion in patient illness severity 
during admission, and treatment expenditures. The first variable measures the extent of 
11 
 
horizontal (spatial) differentiation, and the latter two variables measure the extent of 
vertical (quality) differentiation.  
I find robust evidence that the entry of new hospitals was associated with both 
market-expansion and business-stealing. That is, entry led to increased rates for coronary 
artery bypass graft (CABG) and percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) procedures 
among coronary artery disease (CAD) patients, and decreased surgery rates at incumbent 
hospitals. Further, the business-stealing induced by entry was much more pronounced 
among relatively healthier CAD patients. Higher entrant share was associated with lower 
in-hospital mortality rates and substantial cost-savings, suggesting improved hospital 
efficiency. There is some evidence that the efficiency gain may be derived from enhanced 
hospital differentiation. Based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation, the welfare gain 
from demand-expansion and cost-saving is substantially higher than the total fixed costs 
paid by new entrants since 1997, suggesting that the repeal of CON was social welfare 
improving. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses institutional 
background behind CON laws. Section 1.3 summarizes existing empirical studies on the 
effects of free entry. Section 1.4 outlines a simple model of free entry in a heterogeneous-
product market to illustrate the importance of considering market expansion and hospital 
diversification. Section 1.5 presents the data and summary statistics. Section 1.6 
describes the empirical models for identifying the presence of market expansion and 
business-stealing effects, and the impact of entrant share on patient surgical outcomes 
and costs, as well as on hospital differentiation. Section 1.7 presents the empirical results. 
Section 1.8 discusses the welfare impact of the CON repeal in Pennsylvania. Section 1.9 
12 
 
concludes.  
 
1.2 Background 
Federally mandated in 1974, the Certificate of Need program required individual 
states to review requests for the construction, expanding, and major medical equipment 
acquisition of health care facilities
1
. This regulation was originally implemented in an 
attempt to curb rising health care costs and promote quality of care by limiting 
unnecessary utilization of resources and excessive service provision. In the 1980s, critics 
pointed out that these state-sponsored programs did not meet the goal because they would 
reduce price competition among certified facilities, keeping the prices high and limiting 
the access to care. With the same concern, the federal government ended congressional 
funding for the CON program in 1987. In the decade that followed, 14 states discontinued 
their CON Programs. In Pennsylvania the state CON programs were discontinued in 
December of 1996, essentially allowing free entry into a broad range of hospital services.  
Two features of the cardiac surgery market in Pennsylvania suit it well for the 
empirical study on the impacts of free entry. First, the cardiac care industry is 
characterized by high profit and high fixed costs. Cardiovascular disease is the largest 
single component of hospital expenditures in the country. Revenue from patients 
undergoing cardiac surgeries represents an extremely high proportion of total revenue for 
hospitals. Therefore, deregulation of the cardiac surgery market is likely to attract entry 
and at the same time, to incur nontrivial social costs in new facilities and equipment. It is 
                                                          
1
 Facilities and services regulated by CON majorly included hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, nursing 
homes, and new surgical services such as open heart surgery, cardiac catheterization, neo-natal intensive 
care, and organ transplants. 
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documented that the setup cost of a CABG program was between $12 million and $14 
million (Robinson, Nash et al. 2001; Huckman 2006). Yet very little is known about how 
much patient welfare these investments have turned into.  
Second, cardiac surgery hospitals are highly differentiated in both specialty and 
geographic locations. In most homogeneous-product markets, competition leads to 
socially excessive entry,
2
 but it may not be the case for the cardiac surgery market. Most 
cardiac surgery hospitals specialize in either or both treatments: coronary artery bypass 
graft surgery
3
  (CABG) and percutaneous coronary interventions
4
 (PCI). Patients who are 
more appropriate for CABG procedure tend to seek hospitals that specialize in CABG 
procedures, while those who are more appropriate for PCI procedures tend to receive 
treatments at hospitals that specialize in PCI procedures. Consequently, the cardiac 
surgery market has a potential for hospitals to specialize in different types of patients in 
terms of clinical indications and illness severity. Furthermore, previous studies 
consistently find that travel distance is one of the most important determinants of patients’ 
hospital choice (Luft, Garnick et al. 1990; Tay 2003), suggesting that reduced travel 
distance, resulting from entry, improves patient welfare. Since these effects are not 
captured in a simple model for homogeneous-product markets, it is an empirical question 
whether free entry in the cardiac surgery market leads to increased or decreased social 
                                                          
2
 The critical insight of this literature is that because potential entrants ignore the negative externality on 
incumbent firms’ revenues when making entry decisions, a free-entry industry may incur too many entry 
costs which offset incremental gains in consumer surplus generated through enhanced competition. See 
Chamberlin (1933), Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for details. 
3
 The CABG procedure involves surgically isolating a section of vein or artery and grafting it to create a 
bypass of blockage in the coronary artery. It was developed in the late 1960s and entered mainstream use in 
the United States during the 1970s, largely performed on patients whose indications represent a significant 
risk of heart attack. 
4
 The PCI procedure involves only a small incision through which a balloon-tipped catheter is threaded and 
inflated within the coronary artery to improve the blood supply. The outcome of PCI was largely improved 
with the introduction of stent technology during the mid-1990s, making PCI more substitutable with CABG 
for patients with relatively severe CAD. PCI is less invasive compared to CABG, and thus more often 
performed on patients with relatively mild CAD. 
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welfare.  
Figure 1-1 depicts the trend of new cardiac surgery program openings since 
Pennsylvania repealed its CON in the end of 1996.
5
 Five programs entered immediately 
after the repeal, increasing the total number of providers from 43 to 48. By 2004 there 
were total of 28 post-CON entrants, accounting for 42% of all hospitals providing cardiac 
surgeries in Pennsylvania. The majority of entry occurred in urban or sub-urban areas. In 
contrast to the fact that all incumbent hospitals were performing both types of surgeries, 
new providers entered the market with differentiated preference on treatment. For 
example, among the six new entrants during 2003 and 2004, only one entrant was 
providing both procedures while the other five were providing only PCI procedures. Such 
trend is suggestive that the cardiac surgery markets in Pennsylvania may be evolving 
toward greater degree of specialization with the entry of new programs.  
 
1.3 Previous Literature 
A few empirical papers on entry efficiency focus on the cross-sectional market 
competitive responses to entry. Based on the entry model developed by Bresnahan and 
Reiss (BR)
6
, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) examine the entry efficiency by employing data 
on market shares and prices in radio broadcasting markets. They conclude that due to the 
                                                          
5
 I infer participation in the cardiac surgery market by aggregating the discharge data to the hospital level, 
and observing the number of procedures done at each hospital. CABG and PCI procedures are treated as 
separate markets. A hospital is considered to be “in” the market for CABG (PCI) in any particular year if it 
performed at least 5 CABGs (PCIs) in that year. Such criteria are previously used in the study by Kessler, 
McClellan (2000) and Kessler, Geppert (2005). 
6
 Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) model firms’ entry decision as the equilibrium outcome of a discrete 
game played between potential entrants. The general entry condition suggests that as intensified 
competition shrinks profit margin, entrants need a larger population to generate enough revenue to cover 
fixed entry costs. Thus examining the relationship between the number of firms and the market size allows 
the authors to determine whether additional firms generate additional revenue or just steal business from 
incumbent rival firms. 
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substitute pattern among radio stations, entry resulted in substantial business stealing, and 
that there was socially excessive entry into radio broadcasting. More recently, Abraham 
et al. (2007) analyze entry in the hospital industry with an extension of the BR 
framework
7
. They provide evidence that entry leads to a significant increase in 
competition, which in turn results in decreased hospital profits, expanded market demand, 
and increased quality. A limitation on this cross-sectional literature is that it does not 
offer evidence on market responses to entry overtime. 
Two recent papers, Davis (2006) and Cutler et al. (2010), improve upon previous 
research using longitudinal data to learn about the welfare impact of entry. In examining 
the U.S. movie theater markets in the 1990’s, Davis finds evidence for both business 
stealing and market expansion effects of entry. In particular, the magnitude of business 
stealing depends largely on the entrant theater’s size and location relative to incumbents, 
highlighting the extent to which horizontal differentiation relaxes competition. 
This paper is most similar to Cutler et al. (2010), who use PHC4 data to study the 
changes in patient volume of CABG surgeons in Pennsylvania during the post-CON 
period. The authors hypothesize that hospital entry will increase the demand of high-
quality surgeons whose labor supply is relatively inelastic. The higher the entrant share, 
the high the volume will be shifted to those high-quality surgeons. This hypothesis 
assumes that patients first decide which hospital to visit and then choose their surgeons 
within the hospital. More commonly for CABG procedures, however, it is the surgeons 
that refer their patients to the admitting hospitals. This means that entrant hospitals 
should have the incentive to hire high-volume surgeons in order to increase their market 
                                                          
7
 The authors relaxed the assumption of “equal fixed costs” in the traditional BR model, and separately 
identify the changes in the toughness of competition from the changes in fixed costs due to entry. 
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shares. As a consequence, the entrant share may itself be an outcome, rather than a cause, 
of patient distribution across surgeons. Furthermore, given the fact that CABG and PCI 
both are major procedures performed at cardiac surgery centers, to provide a thorough 
welfare analysis of free entry in cardiac surgery market, both CABG and PCI markets 
need to be examined. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by using an 
individual-level longitudinal dataset, I provide direct observation on the short-term and 
long-term demand responses to entry. Second, by estimating entrant market share with 
exogenous variations (i.e., distances between patients and hospitals), I circumvent the 
concern that market share is endogenously correlated with unobserved hospital and 
patient characteristics. Third, I exploit differences across hospitals in the dispersion of the 
patient population to see whether entry affects differentiation by hospitals. Furthermore, 
by conducting analysis on both CABG and PTCA procedures, this paper provides a more 
comprehensive evaluation on the welfare consequences of free entry in the cardiac 
surgery market. Lastly, by investigating the changes in patient health outcome and 
treatment costs, this paper also supplements the research on the effects of CON 
regulations on medical expenditures and quality of care.
8
 
 
1.4 A Model for Free Entry 
In this section I lay out the standard theory of entry based on the work by Mankiw 
                                                          
8
 Broadly speaking, this literature finds conflicting evidence on the effects of CON. For example, Robinson 
et al.’s (2001) study of the short-term impact of the termination of cardiac CON in Pennsylvania finds no 
evidence that the removal of CON affects the inpatient mortality rate of CABG. Ho et al.'s (2009) cross-
states study finds evidence that the removal of CON regulations leads to lower CABG mortality. In contrast, 
the study by Vaughan-Sarrazin et al. (2002) finds that risk-adjusting in-hospital mortality was 22\% lower 
among CABG patients in states with continuous CON versus states with no CON. 
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and Whinston (1986). Consider a monopolistic competition market where the services 
provided by hospitals are imperfect substitutes for patients. Let the set-up costs for a new 
cardiac program be constant  , and the cost function be     , where   denotes the 
number of procedures performed, and                         for all    . 
Specify the total patients’ utility to be of the form 
         
 
   
   
where    is the number of patients who receive surgery at hospital  ,       is 
patients’ utility generated by hospital   , and   is the total number of hospitals in the 
market. It is assumed that               , and          for all     and that 
       , and          for all    . These concavity assumptions imply that the 
total utility increases when a given quantity patient flow is spread over more hospitals. 
That is, patients prefer variety.
9
 
Assuming that the equilibrium is symmetric, the objective of the social planner in 
this market is therefore to solve 
   
 
                         
where    is the equilibrium volume per hospital, given that   hospitals enter the 
market.  
By differentiating the expression for social surplus,    , with respect to the total 
number of hospitals  , we have 
                                                          
9
 Proof: Since   is a concave function,               
  
       
           
  
       
         
  
       
         
  
       
                 . Given that   is also a concave function,         
                  . 
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Now consider the entrant’s problem. Under free entry, hospitals enter until profits 
are driven to zero. Therefore, the market-equilibrium number of hospitals   meets the 
condition 
     
Note that when   hospitals have entered the market, the inverse demand function 
for all hospitals can be written as
10
 
                       
Thus the equilibrium profits per hospital can be expressed as 
    
          
                 
Rearranging terms and plugging    into the expression for 
     yield 
            
        
   
  
             
When the market reaches a free-entry equilibrium (i.e.,     ), whether social 
surplus is maximized is determined by the second and third term on the right-hand side. 
          in the second term represents hospitals’ marginal profit when there are   
hospitals, and is assume to be greater than zero. The second term thus illustrates the 
business-stealing effect: it is negative as long as the per-hospital volume declines in   
(i.e., 
   
  
  ). The marginal entrant causes all existing hospitals to contract their 
volumes, resulting in a reduction in social surplus equal to           
   
  
. The third 
term represents the differentiation effect: it is positive because patients prefer variety
11
. It 
                                                          
10
 Again, the assumption of symmetric equilibrium applies here. 
11
 Proof: The first derivative of        equals to    
    , which is positive because      . And because 
      , the term        equals 0 when    . Taken together,    
    must be positive for all 
    . Given that     , the third term is therefore positive. 
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demonstrates the fact that the marginal entrant increases the total patient surplus by    , 
but does not fully capture this increase in its revenue,       . 
Since these two effects drive the free-entry equilibrium away from the social 
optimum in opposite directions, no clear theoretical prediction can be made on the overall 
welfare consequence of free-entry. That the entry of a new hospital creates negative 
externality on existing hospitals’ profits suggests that free-entry leads to more hospitals 
than socially optimal. An extreme case of pure business stealing with no differentiation 
effect can be illustrated in Figure 1-2-A, where all hospitals produce homogeneous 
services and the market demand does not respond to entry. Therefore, the social surplus 
remains area ABCD following the entry. As demonstrated in Figure 1-2-B, the profits of 
the (   )th hospital entirely comes from squeezing other hospitals’ demand. Each 
hospital faces a downward-shifted demand and hence a reduction in profits equal to the 
area of rectangle abcd. Consequently, entry of the (   )th hospital simply imposes a 
social cost equal to the   multiplied by the area of abcd. 
Now consider an opposite extreme case of zero business-stealing in Figure 1-3. 
Figure 1-3-B demonstrates the situation where there is a sufficient rise in aggregate 
demand following the entry of hospitals, so that existing hospitals’ volumes are not 
affected (       ). Correspondingly in Figure 1-3-A, the original market demand 
curve is   , with total social surplus of area ABCD. Suppose that entry increases the total 
demand to     . If we also assume that price stays the same, then entry of the (   )th 
hospital would produce additional social welfare benefits given by polygon CBAFE. The 
business-stealing effect vanishes and the variety-effect is positive, thus        , 
meaning that    is negative at social optimum. In this case, free-entry will provide fewer 
20 
 
hospitals than the socially optimal number of hospitals. A social planner would have to 
subsidize entry in order to provide sufficient variety in the market.  
The conclusions of this model can vary according to the change in the underlying 
assumptions of hospitals’ behavior, and the functional forms of patients’ utility and 
hospitals’ profits. For example, Spence (1976) has shown that when there is some degree 
of freedom and all products compete equally with other products
12
, product-variety is 
always stronger than business-stealing, which means that free entry results in insufficient 
entry. However, Koenker and Perry (1981) note that with the same patient utility and 
hospital production function in Spence (1976), post-entry collusion between hospitals 
may make room for excessive entry.  
Despite the uncertainty in the conclusions of the theoretical model, we can still 
derive some empirical implications on free-entry policies in the hospital industry. First, as 
illustrated by the second example above, the repeal of the CON program, which is a 
move from entry-control to free-entry, can be welfare improving if entry results in 
demand expansion.  
A second implication that follows immediately is that incumbent hospitals are 
likely to lose more healthy patients if hospital substitutability leads to a stronger 
business-stealing effect. It is reasonable to believe that for relatively healthy patients, 
hospitals are relatively more substitutable because these patients are usually on a non-
emergency basis and thus have more time to seek for care among hospitals. Also, hospital 
reputation may be less important for healthy patients, as they usually need fewer high-
intensity treatments which require highly specialized surgical teams affiliated with 
                                                          
12
 In Spence (1976)’s setting, individual firm’s demand function is     . The cross-price elasticity of 
demand is a constant        . In the case of substitutes,   ranges between 0 and 1, and each hospital 
treats the aggregate market volume as given (i.e.,    is exogenous of  ). 
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existing hospitals. Although the impact of demand substitutability on the business-
stealing effect is ambiguous in the theory model
13
, it can be empirically tested by 
comparing the demand responses to entry between relatively healthier and relatively 
sicker patients.  
Third, free entry may lead to hospital differentiation in various dimensions. 
Hospitals are horizontally differentiated according to geographic location. Previous 
studies consistently find that travel distance is one of the most important determinants of 
hospital choice (Tay 2003; Luft et al. 1990), especially when travel time increases risk of 
mortality and medical care is needed urgently.
14
 Consequently, patients are expected to 
travel less to hospitals as new entrants introduce more hospital variety on the geographic 
dimension. Furthermore, since prices are either highly regulated or not fully observed by 
insured consumers, hospitals will resort to other aspects to attract patients. Thus free 
entry may lead to increased specialization as hospitals seek to dampen quality 
competition by making their services less substitutable. For example, hospitals need to 
decide whether they should specialize in care for relatively healthy patients or patients 
with more complications. They also need to consider, with the constraint of a limited 
budget, whether they should improve both CABG and PCI programs or specialize in a 
particular procedure. These decisions are likely not only to affect hospitals’ costs, but 
also their patient mix. As some hospitals specialize in treating sicker patients and others 
specialize in treating healthier patients, the with-in hospital dispersion of patient severity 
and utilization is likely to decline following entry. 
                                                          
13
 Mankiw and Whinston (1986) notes that demand substitutability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for the presence of a business-stealing effect. 
14
 Although a large portion of CABG and PCI patients are admitted on a non-emergency basis (such as 
referred by a physician or transferred from another hospital), about $40$ percent patients in Pennsylvania 
seek for treatment at their closest hospital performing cardiac surgeries. 
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Overall, we can conclude from this model that whether the free-entry policy is 
socially desirable depends crucially on how substitutable hospitals are to patients. 
Excessive entry is likely to rise when hospital differentiation is weak relative to business 
stealing. However, if patients care more about hospital differentiation, the loss of social 
welfare due to business stealing is likely to be offset by the social benefits from increased 
hospital differentiation.  
 
1.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
1.5.1 Data 
The empirical analysis primarily uses detailed patient-level longitudinal data from 
the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4). Pennsylvania repealed 
its CON law in December, 1996. I use the inpatient records from 1997 to 2004– 8 years 
after the deregulation of the state’s cardiac surgery market. The data set provides a wide 
range of patient information including age, race, and gender, diagnosis/procedure codes, 
admission source, and insurance type, zip code of residence, total in-hospital charges, and 
length of stay. In addition, the data set identifies the hospital associated with each 
admission record, with which I link the patient data with comprehensive hospital 
characteristics obtained from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey 
of Hospitals. Hospital location, bed capacity, teaching status, ownership, and system 
member status variables are used in the analysis.  
As a proxy of each hospital’s overall quality of cardiac care, in-hospital mortality 
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ratings are collected from Pennsylvania Cardiac Surgery Reports
15
. In each period, 
hospitals are categorized into four groups according to whether a hospital has performed 
above 30 CABG surgeries, and if yes, whether the actual mortality rate was significantly 
higher, lower than, or equal to the risk-adjusted mortality rate.
16
 
 
The patient sample includes individuals admitted to any hospital in Pennsylvania 
with a new diagnosis of CAD. Patients hospitalized for the same diagnosis in the 
previous three years are excluded. Also omitted are patients who reside outside of 
Pennsylvania, traveled farther than 80 miles for care, or for whom zip code information is 
not available.
17
 These restrictions yield a final sample of 580,255 CAD patients.  
The patient-level analysis centers on four outcomes: (i) whether an individual 
patient received CABG surgery or PCI within one quarter after admission for CAD;
18
 (ii) 
all-cause mortality during the hospital stay for the surgery; (iii) Readmission for cardiac 
complication including heart failure, post surgical infection, and any other cardiac 
reasons
19
 in the year following the surgery
20
; and (iv) the total costs of utilization during 
                                                          
15
 These reports are published by PHC4, including in-hospital or 30-day mortality rates, 7- or 30-day 
readmission rates, and post-surgical length of stay for hospitals and surgeons who performed CABG 
surgery on adult patients in a given period. Five reports were issued during the study period, and can be 
found on PHC4’s Web site at www.phc4.org. 
16
 New hospitals were usually not rated immediately. For example, a hospital that entered in the middle of 
2001 would not appear in 2000’s report. It might not appear in 2001’s report either because of too few 
operations performed in 2001. In these cases the hospital will be categorized as “not rated”. 
17
 This accounts for 8% of the entire sample period. 
18
 Procedure codes for CABG: ICD-9-CM 3610-3619. Procedure codes for PCI: ICD-9-CM 3601, 3602, 
3605, 3606, 3607, and 3609. Diagnosis codes for CAD: ICD-9-CM 410x-414x. 
19
 Heart failure (ICD-9-CM 428x) and post surgical infection (ICD-9-CM 9985) are the most common 
causes of readmissions following CABG procedure. Other cardiac reasons (ICD-9-CM 410x-413x) are 
included in order to capture all the potential adverse outcomes due to the surgeries. 
20
 Measures of readmission are obtained by abstracting data on the principle diagnosis for all subsequent 
hospital visits, not counting transfers and readmissions within 3 months of the index admission. 
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hospital stay for the surgery
21
.  
 
1.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1-1 presents the descriptive statistics for patient outcomes and characteristics 
for the entire sample as well as for subsamples of CABG and PCI patients. The first 
column shows that 50% of hospitalized CAD patients in the study period received either 
CABG or PCI procedure within 3 month after admission. Over half of the CAD sample 
consists of Medicare patients, slightly less than half are admitted through an emergency 
department, and the majority live in urban counties. The next two columns show that 
CABG patients experience higher in-hospital mortality than PCI patients, while PCI 
patients are under greater risk of subsequent readmissions due to heart failure or ischemic 
heart diseases. CABG patients on average are more costly to treat, and stay in hospital for 
longer than PCI patients. The CABG patient sample consists of a larger share of elderly 
and severely ill (Charlson co-morbidity index   ) patients than the PCI population, and 
there are a higher proportion of CABG patients admitted with other fatal complications 
such as cardiogenic shock, hypertension, Congestive heart failure, diabetes, or renal 
failure. PCI patients are more likely to have received CABG or PCI procedure previously, 
although this group accounts for less than 2% of the PCI patient sample.  
The hospital-level analysis uses outcome measures aggregated from the patient 
sample. For each CABG (PCI) hospital I calculate the average distances travelled by 
patients, the coefficient of variation (CV) of patient severity, and treatment intensity. 
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 Because the PHC4 data only records the total charge for each patient, a “listed price” rather than how 
much hospitals spend on patients, I calculate each patient’s costs by multiplying the patient’s total charges 
with the admitting hospital’s Medicare cost-to-charge ratio obtained from the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS). 
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Patient severity is measured by patient’s Charlson co-morbidity index22 and the patient’s 
previous-year total in-hospital expenditures at admission. Treatment intensity is measured 
by the patient’s total in-hospital expenditures during hospital stay. The CV serves as 
proxy of patient population heterogeneity; it is advantageous to standard deviation 
because it is free of the constant differences in patient severity and utilization among 
hospitals. The changes in these hospital-level statistics thus reflect the changes in hospital 
differentiation in geographic locations and specialization.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 1-2 reflect some broad trends. The average 
distance between patients and admitting hospitals decreased by 12% (1.8 miles) during 
1997 to 2004. The CV of in-hospital expenditures also decreased. Among hospitals, the 
average share of Medicare patients was increasing, while the shares of large, non-for-
profit and teaching hospitals, and the share of hospitals that belonged to any health 
system were falling. Some of the newly opened cardiac programs with insufficient annual 
surgery volumes were not rated. The number of such facilities increased and then 
declined sharply, as the growing new programs finally reached the “gradable” threshold.  
Figures 1-4 and 1-5 contrast the trends in 3-month rates of CABG and PCI 
procedure in Hospital Referral Regions (HRR) where entry occurred and where entry 
never occurred during 1997 to 2004. These rates are expressed as the number of 
procedures per 1,000 new CAD patients in the study sample. Figure 1-4 shows that 
despite the continuing entry of new surgery centers, CABG rates declined from about 20% 
in 1999 to 15% in 2004. The trends in regions that did and did not experience entry 
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 The Charlson co-morbidity Index contains 19 categories of co-morbidity, defined using ICD-9-CM 
diagnoses codes. Each category is assigned with a score ranging from 1 to 6; the higher the weight, the 
higher one-year mortality risk associated with the category (Charlson et al. 1987). A patient’s Charlson 
index is the sum of these weights, reflecting the cumulative increased likelihood of dying during the 
follow-up year. In this paper, patient’s Charlson index is calculated using STATA command “charlson”. 
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almost overlapped with each other. However, CABG rates declined slightly slower in 
regions that experienced entry. Figure 1-5 shows a significantly and constantly higher 
rate of PCI in regions that experienced entry relative to in those that never experienced 
entry. It also shows a pronounced increase in the rate of PCI over time. The time-series is 
only suggestive, however, since it does not adjust for the time of entry and the number of 
entrants in different regions. The trends may as well be driven by underlying differences 
in medical practice patterns and population composition within each region. 
 
1.6 Econometric Framework 
1.6.1 Measure of Entrants’ Market Share 
The empirical strategy is to identify the impacts of entry using the variation in 
entrant hospitals’ market share across markets and over time. Many previous studies 
calculate market share as the share of a hospital’s total discharges over all discharges in 
the hospital’s market (Krishnan 2001; Cutler 201023). However, this measure may result 
in biased estimates of the impact of entry on market demand, costs, and health outcomes. 
First, it assumes that hospitals in the same geographic area are exposed to the same 
entrant share, which may lead to substantial measurement error. In fact, in urban areas 
many hospitals compete with only a few nearby entrants, while hospitals in rural areas 
with zero entrants are not necessarily unaffected by entry in other markets. Second, 
unobservable patient characteristics may be correlated with both entrant market share and 
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 For example, Cutler et al (2010) defines markets by the Hospital Referral Region (HRR). Each HRR 
comprises a group of zip codes within which people are referred for major cardiovascular surgical 
procedures and neurosurgery. There are 14 HRRs in the Pennsylvania, among which 5 had no cardiac 
surgery hospital by 2004. 
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surgery outcomes, causing bias in the estimated effects of entry on patient outcomes. For 
example, if unobservably sicker patients choose to go to better hospitals, which are 
usually located in urban areas with higher entrant share, the estimated impact of entry on 
patient outcome will be biased away from zero. 
To address these potential sources of bias, I construct the predicted CABG and PCI 
entrant programs’ share using a two-step method, analogous to the one developed in 
Kessler and McClellan (2000). I assign each patient with the entrant share at his/her zip 
code of residence. Thus each zip code area is a single market. CABG (PCI) entrant shares 
are calculated as the share of CABG (PCI) patients living in zip code area   who went to 
any new hospital for treatment.  
First, I estimate patient-level hospital choice with a multinomial conditional logit 
model.
24
 An individual patient’s utility from going to a certain hospital is considered as a 
function of the individual’s characteristics, the hospital’s attributes, and relative distances 
between the hospital and the individual’s closest alternatives in each attribute. These 
relative distances between hospitals capture the exogenous impact of travel costs on 
individual’s hospital choice. The model is estimated by year for CABG and PCI patients 
separately, allowing the preferences over hospitals to vary over time and among patients 
seeking for different types of treatments. To address the problem that HMO/POS 
enrollees’ hospital choices are constrained by their insurance plans, I estimate the model 
with a subsample including only Medicare enrollees, whose hospital choices are 
unrestricted. Estimated coefficients from the discrete-choice model are then applied to 
patients with all insurance types to predict the probability of patient   going to hospital   
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 See the appendix for details of the conditional logit specification and the construction of predicted entrant 
share. 
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for CABG or PCI surgery. The assumption here is that Medicare patients have similar 
preference over hospitals with their HMO/POS counterparts conditional on diagnosis, 
home location, and other demographics. This assumption has been made several times in 
the existing literature.
25
 Second, I estimate the patient flow from each zip code   to 
hospital   by summing up the predicted probabilities across hospitals and zip codes. Thus 
the entrant share in zip code   equals to the total predicted patient flow of all entrant 
hospitals divided by the total predicted patient flow in that zip code.  
There are a couple of features about this method that address the potential concern 
of entrant market share. First, the method does not restrict individual’s choice set within a 
discrete geographic area, and thus the expected entrant share captures not only the impact 
of entrants in one geographic area, but also the potential impact of entrants in nearby 
areas. Second, the hospital demand is predicted based only on observable, exogenous 
characteristics of patients, hospitals, and relative distances between alternative hospitals. 
Thus the predicted entrants’ market share assigned to each patient is uncorrelated with 
unobservable attributes of individual patients and hospitals. Finally, measuring entrant 
share at the zip code level creates more variation in entrant share that facilities 
identification of entrants’ impact. 
 
1.6.2  Patient-level Analysis 
The patient-level analysis compares changes in surgery incidence in markets where 
new entrants had a larger market share following the Pennsylvania CON deregulation to 
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 For example, Ho (2006) and Town and Vistnes (2001) use data on the hospital selection decisions of 
Medicare enrollees, assuming that the Medicare population’s valuation of hospitals is a reasonable proxy 
for that of HMO/POS population. 
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markets where they had less market share. To test the market-expansion effect of new 
CABG hospitals (a similar analysis separately applies to PCI hospitals), I use the first-
time CAD patient sample to estimate regressions of the form:  
                    
         (1)  
where the dependent variable      equals to one if patient   from zip code   at time 
  received CABG (PCI) surgery within one quarter after admission to a hospital for CAD, 
   denotes zip-code fixed effects,    denotes year fixed effects, and      is an error term. 
To account for possible serial correlation over time within zip code areas, I allow for an 
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix in the error structure within each zip code area. 
The key variables of interest are entrant share    , a vector of indicators for whether 
the entrant share of CABG(PCI) procedures in zip code   at time   falls in either of the 
two categories: 10-25 percent or above 25 percent. The reference group is entrant share 
below 10 percent. The coefficient vector   thus identifies the differences in per-patient 
demand for surgery in areas where entry is more prevalent relative to areas where entry is 
rare. If      , then the entry of new hospitals expanded the market demand for CABG 
(PCI) surgery among CAD patients. If     are zero, then the entry is pure business 
stealing; the market demand for CABG (PCI) does not increase following the entry, 
leaving the hospitals in a stiffer competition for market share.  
To mitigate the concerns that other factors might also have affected a patient 
likelihood of receiving any surgery, equation (1) also includes    
 , a vector of patient 
characteristics including indicator variables for age (50-59, 60-69, 70-79, and 80 or older; 
omitted group is 49 or younger), race (White, Black, Asian; omitted group is other races), 
gender, urban residence, Charlson co-morbidity index (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and  6; omitted 
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group is 0), admission status (emergency admission and transferred admission), insurance 
type (Medicare, Medicaid, HMO, fee-for-service; omitted group is other insurance or 
uninsured) and major clinical indications at admission (cardiogenic shock, hypertension, 
dialysis, heart failure, renal failure, and acute myocardial infarction). Of particular 
concern is the potential confounding influence of health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs). Featured by utilization monitoring on high cost services, HMOs are less likely 
to encourage hospitalization and expensive surgical procedures. Therefore, high HMO 
penetration may reduce the overall demand for surgery. On the other hand, high HMO 
penetration may as well increase the overall demand for surgery if HMOs’ selective 
contracting has successfully enhanced price competition among hospitals and lowered 
hospital prices, making high-cost surgeries like CABG more affordable (Town and 
Vistnes 2001; Miller and Luft 1997). I control for any impact of HMO penetration by 
including in    
  a continuous variable for the percentage of HMO enrollees each year in 
the patient’s county of residence.  
Finally, the characteristics of the admitting hospital are not included in the patient-
level specifications. There are two reasons for this. First, emergency patients are usually 
taken to the closest hospital for initial treatment and diagnosis. Depending on the risk for 
adverse outcomes, the patient may be discharged, transferred to a higher level of hospital, 
or receive surgical procedures immediately.
26
 Thus, an emergency patient’s likelihood of 
surgery does not necessarily relate to the characteristics of the initial admitting hospital. 
Second, for scheduled patients, the choice of admitting hospital may be endogenous of a 
patient’s illness severity. Patients with mild conditions (thus a lower likelihood of surgery) 
may be referred to non-cardiac surgery hospitals, while patients with acute conditions 
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 See Braunwald et al. (1994) for details. 
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(thus a higher likelihood of surgery) are more likely to be referred to hospitals with 
cardiac-surgery hospitals.  
New hospitals may have seized the market share from existing hospitals whether or 
not the total demand is expanded. To test the business-stealing effect between new and 
existing providers, I replace      in equation (1) with a binary variable that equals to one 
if the patient received CABG(PCI) surgery at any incumbent hospitals within one quarter 
of admission for CAD. It is worth noting that emergency patients were often stabilized at 
one hospital and then transferred to another hospital for surgical treatment, in which case 
the hospital of initial admission is not necessarily the same as the hospital that delivers 
the surgery. As such, a negative   indicates a decrease in per-patient demand of surgery 
at incumbent hospitals, rather than a decrease in the likelihood of surgery after patients 
being admitted to incumbent hospitals.  
As previously discussed, the effect of entry may vary with the extent to which 
hospitals are substitutes to patients. If business-stealing effect increases with hospital 
substitutability, then incumbent hospitals are expected to lose more healthy patients as a 
result of entry (because hospitals are more substitutable for relatively healthier patients). 
To test this hypothesis, I estimate one variant of equation (1) to explore the nature of 
entry impact by comparing the heterogeneous demand response of high- versus low-risk 
patients. Specifically, I include in equation (1) the interactions of a patient’s illness 
severity before treatment      and entrant share    : 
                                             
         (2)  
 where      equals to 1 if the patient Charlson co-morbidity index is equal or 
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greater than 2
27
. In the business-stealing analysis where the dependent variable indicates 
whether a patient receives treatment from any incumbent hospital,      and      are both 
expected to be negative, with      significantly larger in absolute value.   
The above analysis has treated all hospitals that entered after 1997 CON-repeal as 
new hospitals. However, this assumption may not be appropriate if the impact of entry is 
only temporary. As robustness check, I alternatively define entrants as hospitals that were 
“in the market” for only three years or less. With this new definition, very few new 
entrants achieved 10 percent market share in a three-year period. I therefore use 1-10 
percent and above 10 percent as the cut-offs for entrant share categories. The estimation 
results may be considered as the “short-term” impacts of entry as opposed to “cumulative” 
impacts derived from the main results.  
To assess the effects of entry on surgery outcome and costs, I create two 
subsamples from the new-CAD patient sample, selecting those did undergo CABG or 
PCI procedures. For each subsample, I then reestimate equation (2) with      being a 
binary variable that equals one if the patient died during the hospital stay for surgery, or 
experienced cardiac complications during one year following the treatment. If       
then entry increases the probability of adverse outcomes. Similarly, I then let      be the 
log of total cost during the hospital stay and total in-hospital expenditures in three 
quarters following the surgery. If       then entry increases the resource use on CABG 
(PCI) patients.  
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 The ability of CCI to predict surgical risk was assessed in previous literature. See Charlson et al. (1987) 
and O’Connor et al. (1992) for details. 
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1.6.3 Hospital-level Analysis 
An important limitation of the patient-level estimation is that it does not capture 
any hospital-differentiation effect, a potential source of welfare gain through free entry as 
previously pointed out. In this section I present a hospital-level analysis by examining the 
impacts of entrant share on differentiation by hospitals.  
To test the hypothesis that hospital entry leads to improved geographic 
differentiation, I estimate the following equation:  
                   
         (3)  
where     is the average distance from patients’ zip code of residence to hospital   
at time  ;    
  is a vector of hospital characteristics including bed capacity (200 beds to 
400 beds and >400 beds; omitted group is <200 beds), teaching status
28
,  whether it is 
not-for-profit, whether it belongs to any health care system, its rating according to the 
Cardiac Surgery Report Cards (in-hospital mortality lower than expected, same as 
expected, and higher than expected; omitted group is unrated), and the share of Medicare 
admissions in total inpatient admissions. Hospital fixed effects    is used to capture any 
time-invariant unobserved hospital characteristics. 
Since hospitals attract patients from many zip code areas, the market share     is 
constructed at the hospital level.     equals the weighted average of entrant share in zip 
code areas where hospital   draws its patients, with weights being the relative likelihood 
that patients in each zip code area will be admitted to hospital  .29 Thus the coefficient 
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 Two binary measures of teaching status are used, the first being whether the hospital has more than 20 
full-time residents, and the second being whether the hospital is a member of Council of Teaching 
Hospitals and Health Systems (COTH). 
29
 See appendix B for details of the construction of hospital-level entrant share. 
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vector   identifies the shift in patient distance to hospitals under larger impact of entrants 
relative to hospitals under smaller impact. Negative coefficients suggest that on average 
hospitals facing higher entrant share draw patients from a closer neighborhood. That is, 
higher entrant share is associated with greater geographic differentiation.  
To explore whether entry leads to a smaller within-hospital dispersion of patient 
severity and utilization, I calculate the hospital-level CV of Charlson co-morbidity index, 
prior-year total hospital expenditures, and hospital expenditure for the CABG(PCI) 
surgery among patients receiving surgeries in each hospital. I reestimate equation (3), 
using these with-in hospital coefficients of variation as dependent variables. Again, 
coefficient vector     are expected to be negative.   
 
1.7 Results 
My empirical results suggest that both market-expansion effect and business-
stealing effect are present in the CABG and PCI markets. Table 1-3 shows the demand 
responses to entry. The estimates in the table are the result of eight sets of regressions, 
with the top panel showing the effects of cumulative entrant shares and the lower panel 
showing the effects of 3-year entrant shares.  
Columns (1) and (2) in panel A of Table 1-3 suggest that higher entrant share was 
associated with a significant increase in the incidence of CABG and PCI. Given that the 
sample average of CABG rates in CAD patient sample was 18.8 percent, the estimates in 
the column (1) suggest that for an average CAD patient, entry resulting in 10 to 25 
percent market share of CABG entrants led a 10.1 percent increase in the probability of 
undergoing CABG surgery within three months after being diagnosed as CAD. In 
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markets with CABG entrant share above 25 percent, entry led to a 13.9 percent in the 
probability of undergoing CABG surgery. Similarly, patients were 2.9 percent (based on 
a 31.2 percent average PCI rate) more likely to receive PCI surgeries in markets with PCI 
entrant share between 10 and 25 percent market share, and were 10.9 percent more likely 
to receive PCI surgeries in markets where PCI entrant share above 25 percent. The 
magnitude of these effects is economically significant
30
.  
Columns (3) and (4) investigate the existence of business-stealing effect in the 
CABG and PCI markets. Results in column (3) indicate that increasing CABG entrant 
share up to 25 percent did not affect existing hospitals’ demand. However, a further 
increase in the entrant share above 25 percent resulted in fewer patients receiving 
surgeries from incumbent CABG hospitals. Expressed as a percent change, the share of 
patients receiving CABG from any incumbent CABG hospital decreased by 11.7 percent 
(based on a 16.2 percent sample average). The business-stealing effect was stronger for 
the PCI market. Coefficients in column (4) suggest that increasing entrant market share 
beyond 10 up to 25 percent was associated with a drop of 1.5 percentage points in 
existing PCI hospitals’ demand, and the drop was 5.8 percentage points as entrant market 
share grows beyond 25 percent. An average CAD patient had a 26 percent chance to 
receive PCI at an existing hospital. These business-stealing effects thus equal to a 5 
percent decrease in existing hospitals’ demand in markets with 10 to 25 percent entrant 
share and a 22 percent decrease in markets with above 25 percent entrant share. The 
relative sizes of business-stealing effects and entrant market share suggest that entrant 
hospitals gained market share not entirely by stealing patients from incumbent hospitals; 
                                                          
30
 It is also worth emphasizing that findings in this paper run counter to the cross-state study of Ho et al. 
(2009), which concludes that CON removal does not affect the statewide CABG and PCI volume. This is 
potentially to be attributed to the heterogeneous market responses across states that stopped CON programs. 
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part of their market share came from newly expanded total surgery demand.  
The estimated market responses to new entrants in the most recent 3 years are 
reported in panel B, which shows that the findings in panel A are robust to an alternative 
definition of entrants. The 3-year entrant share is associated with increased market 
demand but reduced surgery demand for CABG and PCI at incumbent hospitals. 
Compared with panel A, these results further imply that market-expansion effects tend to 
have a smaller magnitude in the short run, whereas business-stealing effects are more 
pronounced in the first few years when new entrants start to build their business.  
Table 1-4 investigates the extent to which hospitals expand market demand and 
compete for market share among low- and high-risk patients. Estimates from column (1) 
of panel A indicate that the market-expansion effect of entry was much more pronounced 
for high-risk patients than for low-risk patients. Increasing the entrant share to 10-25 
percent and above 25 percent was associated with a substantial increase in CABG rates 
among high-risk patients by 2.7 and 4.1 percentage points, respectively; while the same 
rises in the entrant share only increased CABG rates by at most 1.5 percentage points 
among low-risk patients. This perhaps reflects that sicker CAD patients gain more 
benefits from obtaining more intensive treatments and thus have a stronger incentive to 
incur financial costs and other costs to do so. In contrast with the CABG markets, 
Column (2) shows a greater increase in the use of PCI procedure among low-risk patients 
as entrant share increases. This result is consistent with previous evidence that PCI has 
been increasingly used on low-severity CAD patients who would have otherwise received 
non-surgical treatment (Cutler and Huckman 2003). 
Consistent with the second empirical implication in section IV, estimates in the 
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next two columns of panel A indicate a stronger business stealing effect among relatively 
healthy CAD patients. Column (3) shows that in markets with CABG entrants holding 
above 25 percent market share, incumbent hospitals experienced significant decreases in 
the demand of low-risk patients. This result is not surprising given the findings in column 
(1) that entrant CABG hospitals were less able to generate new demand among low-risk 
CAD patients. In the meanwhile, 10 to 25 percent entrant share in fact had a slightly 
positive impact on incumbent hospitals’ demand among high-risk patients, perhaps 
suggesting that the expanded demand of high-risk patients due to entry had a spillover 
effect on incumbent hospitals. Such a pattern may reflect increased access to surgery, 
increased the referral recommendations, and reduced barrier to care for sicker patients. 
Similarly, the magnitude of estimates in column (4) suggests that incumbent PCI 
hospitals also lost more low-risk patients, despite the substantial market-expansion effect 
among these patients. Overall, these distinct demand responses in low- and high-risk 
patient groups support the hypothesis that the business-stealing effect induced by free 
entry is stronger among low-risk patients, because new hospitals are more substitutable to 
existing hospitals for them than for high-risk patients.  
The estimation results in panel B using the 3-year entrant share again suggest that 
in the short run, entry had a more immediate business-stealing effect rather than the 
demand-expansion effect. Consistent with panel A, the coefficients in columns (1) and (2) 
indicate a larger increase in CABG demands among relatively sicker patients, and a 
larger increase in PCI demands among relatively healthier patients. Also consistent with 
panel A, there was a stronger business-stealing effect in both CABG and PCI markets in 
the short run. For example, the average PCI rate is 20 percent for relatively sicker 
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patients and 30 percent for relatively healthier patients. Increasing 3-year entrant share 
above 10 percent was associated with 18.5 percent loss of sicker patients and 29.7 percent 
loss of healthier patients in incumbent hospitals.  
 Table 1-5 presents estimates of the effects of CABG and PCI entrant share on in-
hospital mortality, one-year readmission, log of length of stay, and log of costs during the 
hospital stay of new CAD patients who underwent CABG or PCI procedures. Panel A 
and B report the results for the CABG patient sample and the PCI patient sample, 
respectively. Panel A suggests that in general, sicker CABG patients were under greater 
risk of experiencing death and readmissions due to adverse CAD conditions and post-
surgical infections, and were also more costly to treat than healthier patients. Compared 
with high-risk patients in markets with the least entrant share, patients from markets with 
10 to 25 percent entrant share experienced 0.004 percentage points lower in-hospital 
mortality, which was marginally significant. Interpreted as a share of average in-hospital 
mortality among high-risk patients undergoing CABG, which is 2.58 percent, entry of 
new cardiac programs had the potential to improve CABG mortality by 15.5 percent. 
Patients’ one-year readmission rates were not significantly affected by rises in entrant 
share, suggesting that the additional survivors were not in especially marginal health.  
The next two columns in panel A show that patients in markets with higher CABG 
entrant share experienced statistically significant reduction in length of stay and surgery 
costs. In particular, raising entrant share above 25 percent is associated with a reduction 
of surgery costs by 5.7 percent for high-risk CABG patients and by 4.9 percent for low-
risk CABG patients. Given that the average total costs of CABG surgery were about 
$25,000 and $21,000 for high- and low-risk patients, the above estimates suggest that 
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entry resulting in above 25 percent market share led to about $1,000-$1,400 decrease in 
total costs per CABG surgery. It is important to notice that this result does not necessarily 
indicate cost-savings for patients since actually out-of-pocket payment is not observed; 
rather, it suggests improved efficiency of hospitals and surgeons performing surgeries.  
Panel B shows that for patients undergoing PCI procedures, the in-hospital 
mortality and one-year readmission rates are not significantly affected by rises in entrant 
share. PCI patients in markets with higher entrant share experienced longer hospital stay 
and lower surgery costs. Since the average length of stay is only 4.2 and 2.7 days for 
high- and low-risk patients, the increase in length of stay was not economically 
substantial. Given that the average total costs of PCI surgery were about $15,000 and 
$12,000 for high- and low-risk patients, the results in column (4) suggest that entry 
resulting in above 25 percent market share led to about $420-$510 decrease in total costs 
per PCI surgery. 
 
Overall, the patient-level analysis could be interpreted as broadly suggestive of an 
increase in the patient welfare. Entry of new cardiac surgery programs led to expanded 
market demand for surgery, improved quality of care, and reduced hospital utilization. 
Such efficiency gain may have resulted from improved specialization of hospitals, or 
shorter travelling distance as the number of hospitals increased. In addition, Table 1-5 
finds little evidence of learning effect at the hospital-level for both cardiac procedures. 
Quality did not seem to decrease as patient flows were diluted with the entry of new 
hospitals.  
Table 1-6 provides evidence on improved hospital differentiation as a consequence 
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of entry, by comparing the impacts of entrant market share on various hospital outcomes. 
The unit of analysis for the regressions is the hospital-year. Coefficients in the panel A 
show that higher CABG entrant share is associated with shorter patient distance and 
lower dispersion in patients’ hospital expenditures. Patient heterogeneity in terms of 
illness severity at admission and prior-year hospital expenditures was not significantly 
affected by entrant share. Panel B shows a similar pattern for PCI providers. In general, 
these findings provide evidence that free entry led hospitals to draw patients from closer 
locations and to treat patients with increasingly similar intensity, which resulted in less 
dispersed level of utilization. Such differentiation effect may provide an explanation to 
the efficiency gain suggested by results in Table 1-4.  
 
1.8 Welfare Evaluation 
The conventional way to evaluate welfare effect in health care is to compare the 
effect on total resources used to the effect on patients’ health outcomes. Results in Table 
1-4 suggest that in markets with 10 to 25 percent entrant share, high-risk CABG patients 
experienced 0.4 percentage point lower in-hospital mortality rate. Given a total of 7541 
high-risk CABG patients in these markets, this estimate indicates entry is associated 
about 30 additional patients survived during the study period. Previous research estimates 
that an average CABG patient gain 6.58 quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) during the 
following 10 years (Hlatky et al. 2004), and that the value of a year of life in good health 
are between $100,000 and $250,000 (Culter 2004; Murphy and Topel 2006). Using these 
figures, the estimated monetary benefits associated with improved mortality were $20 to 
$50 million. These estimates are summarized in column (1) of Table 1-7.  
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The empirical results also suggest that CABG patients in markets with entrant share 
above 25% spend $1,000 to $1,400 less, and PCI patients in markets with entrant share 
above 25% spend $420 to $510 less than patients in other markets. Column (3) of Table 
1-7 shows the estimated monetary value of cost savings. Given that about 22,800 CABG 
and 48,400 PCI procedures are performed in these markets, the estimated total cost-
saving induced by entry was between $61 and $46 million (in 2000 dollars). Based on 
estimates by Robinson et al. (2001) and Huckman (2006), the average fixed costs per new 
program vary between $12 and $14 million. Thus the total internal costs associated with 
establishing new cardiac surgery programs was approximately between $280 and $320 
million for the 23 new cardiac programs attributed to CON repeal. Combining these 
figures with the amount of cost savings, column (6) shows that the total costs associated 
with the CON repeal were estimated to be between $219 and $274 million, far greater 
than the upper-bound of benefit gains from improved patient mortality rate. Without 
considering the demand response, one would therefore conclude that free entry led to 
socially wasteful investments.  
However, evaluating the overall welfare effects of entry also requires estimates of 
demand responses, as well as estimates of effects on differentiations and on enlarged 
patients’ choice set. For the former, my analysis illustrates that there is substantial 
potential for entrant hospitals to increase market demand. The results in Table 1-4 show 
that on average CAD patients are 1.9-2.6 percentage points more likely to receive CABG 
and 0.9-3.4 percentage points more likely to receive PCI in markets with higher entrant 
share. These results yield an estimated increase of 960 CABG patients and 1909 PCI 
patients during 1997-2004.  
42 
 
According to estimates from Hlatky et al (2004), CABG and PCI patients on 
average gain 6.58 and 6.45 QALY, respectively, during the following 10 years. The life-
time medical costs accrued after surgery are $123,000 for CABG patients and $120,750 
(in 2000 dollars) for PCI patients. Again applying the estimates $100,000 to $250,000 per 
QALY, the estimated total monetary benefits are $535,000 to $1,522,000 for each 
additional CABG procedure and $524,250 to $1,491,750 for each additional PTCA 
procedure. 
Assuming this applies to all patients
31
, column (2) of Table 1-7 shows that the entry 
of new cardiac programs is estimated to have led to an increase of at least $1.5 billion 
(535,000*960+524,250*1909) in social welfare during this period. This estimate far 
exceeds the total social costs of entry by new surgery programs, leading to the conclusion 
that entry induced by CON deregulation is welfare improving. This finding underscores 
the importance of recognizing the demand responses to entry in economic evaluation of 
policies on hospital entry. 
The above calculations do not include all aspects of the welfare effects of entry. I 
do not account for the welfare gains due to hospital differentiation and enlarged patient’s 
choice set, because the literature does not provide the dollar values on them. I only 
account for quality improvements and cost-savings of patients who received CABG or 
PCI surgeries. Entry may yield gains for patients who received less intensive treatments 
such as catheterization and medication. Therefore, my calculation most likely 
underestimate welfare benefits associated with entry. 
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 The result in Table 1-5 that CABG patients did not experience adverse health outcomes guarantees that 
this estimate could be applied to the increased population of CABG and PCI patients. 
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1.9 Conclusion 
Well-established economic theory predicts welfare loss on free entry to 
monopolistic competitive markets when firms provide homogenous products and entry 
incurs large fixed set-up costs. Theory also indicates that market expansion and 
additional welfare gains derived from product variety may alter this conclusion. However, 
we know remarkably little about the welfare consequences of free entry in 
heterogeneous-product industries.  
In studying the Pennsylvania cardiac care market, this paper finds robust evidence 
that entry led to expanded demand of CABG and PCI procedures among CAD patients 
who are at risk of cardiac surgeries. For both procedures, the business stealing effect 
appears to be stronger among relatively healthy CAD patients, suggesting that the market 
responses to entry may be systematically different for patients with different medical 
needs. The empirical findings from outcome analysis further suggest that entry led to 
improved in-hospital mortality rates and reduced surgery cost. Finally, the results from 
hospital-level analysis provide some evidence that entry is associated with improved 
specialization of hospitals and reduced travelling distance by patients. Even without 
accounting for benefits from enhanced hospital differentiation, the welfare gains from 
free entry exceed the total fixed costs of entry by new surgery programs.  
This paper does not address whether the increased surgery rate is associated with 
supply-induced demand or procedure overuse. This depends on whether these additional 
surgeries are performed on patients to whom the benefits from surgery exceed the 
associated risk and costs. To address this question, one would have to access more 
detailed patients’ clinical data in order to determine the appropriateness of a certain 
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procedure on each patient.
32
 The evidence that increased entrant share was not associated 
with adverse health outcomes suggests that at least on the health dimension there were no 
substantial adverse welfare effects. However, whether entry in hospital industry leads to 
overuse of medical care remains an interesting question for further research.   
The empirical results of this paper directly speak only to the impact of free entry 
policy in the hospital industry, and may not be generalized to other industries where the 
dimensions of product differentiation are limited. Nevertheless, the idea presented here 
should also apply to various surgery markets in other states, many of which repealed their 
CON laws in the 1990s. An investigation of the response of demand to hospital entry in 
other states is another interesting direction for future research and would be particularly 
useful for understanding the extent to which the results presented here generalize to 
nationwide.
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 See Chandra and Staiger (2007) for details. 
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1.10 Appendix A: Estimating Patient Flow 
I construct the predicted CABG and PCI entrant programs’ market share using a 
two-step method, analogous to the one developed in Kessler and McClellan(2000). First, 
I estimate patient-level hospital choice models as a function of exogenous determinants 
of the hospital admission decision. The utility function is a composite of patient, 
physician, and insurer utility, all of which influence hospital choice. The choice set   for 
each individual   at year   is comprised of all non-federal hospitals offering at least 5 
CABG (PCI) within 80-mile radius of her residence. This distance threshold captures 
over 99% of all patients. I model individual  ’s indirect expected utility from choosing 
hospital   as  
            
        
        
          
      
          
     
        
        (4)  
  is specified as a nonparametric function of the interaction between individual’s 
characteristics    and hospital characteristics   
 .   is specified as a nonparametric 
function of relative distances and hospital characteristics to flexibly capture the impact of 
travel costs and hospital characteristics on an individual’s hospital choice. Specifically, 
hospital   is characterized by   binary characteristics   
        
 , and the utility of 
individual   from choosing   depends on the relative distances to its good substitutes 
(same-type) and the relative distances to its poor substitutes (different-type). Thus, there 
are     relative distances that influence the utility of individual   from choosing  :    
   
equals the distance from   to hospital   minus the distance from   to the closest hospital    
with    
     
 , and    
   equals the distance from   to hospital   minus the distance from   
to the closest hospital    with    
     
 .    
   and    
   will capture the impact of lower 
46 
 
travel cost for a good/bad substitute at dimension    on an individual’s choice decision. 
To allow for any nonparametric relationship between distances and patient’s choice, I 
categorize    
   and    
   into four quartile dummies based on the distribution of the 
respective relative distance. That is,    
         
          
    and    
   
      
          
   . 
If individual   receives treatment at hospital  , it is assumed that the utility 
associated with hospital   must exceed that of all other hospitals that   could have chosen. 
Denote       if individual   is treated at hospital  . As McFadden (1973) notes, the 
probability of individual   choosing hospital   equal to  
 
          
             
                 
  (5)  
I estimate equation (5) using maximum likelihood. The model is estimated by year 
for CABG and PCI patients separately, allowing the preference over hospital location and 
other characteristics to vary among different types of patients and over time. This method 
is not feasible with HMO/POS enrollees since their hospital choices are constrained and 
unobserved in the data. To address this problem I estimate equation (3)(5) with Medicare 
enrollees’ sample whose hospital choices are unrestricted, assuming that Medicare 
patients have similar preference over hospitals with their HMO/POS counterparts 
conditional on diagnosis, home location, and other demographics. Estimated coefficients 
from equation (5) are then used to predict     , the expected demand for CABG(PCI) at 
hospital   from patients living in zip code  , for patients of all insurance types: 
 
         
   
  (6)  
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where     denotes the predicted probability of individual   receiving procedure 
CABG(PCI) at hospital  .  
 
1.11 Appendix B: Constructing Entrant Market Share 
Let   
   
 be the entrants’ share in zip code  . It simply equals the number of 
patients living in zip code   who go to new cardiac centers for surgery divided by the 
total number of patients in zip code  : 
 
  
     
           
         
  (7)  
where     denotes the set of entrant hospitals, and   denotes the full set of hospitals 
providing CABG(PCI) procedure.  
A given hospital   will form conjecture about the impact of entrants over those 
patients that it is likely to attract. Thus in the hospital-level analysis I weight   
   
 for 
hospital   by the relative likelihood that patients in zip code   will be admitted to hospital 
 . That is, 
 
  
         
    
   
      (8)  
where      is the expected share of patients admitted to hospital   who live in zip 
code   and equals               .
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Table 1-1 Descriptive Statistics for CAD, CABG and PCI Patient Samples 
 
CAD 
Sample 
CABG 
Sample 
PCI 
Sample 
1-quarter CABG rate 18.8% 
  1-quarter PCI rate 31.2% 
  1-quarter CABG rate at incumbent hospitals 16.2% 
  1-quarter PCI rate at incumbent hospitals 26.0% 
  In-hospital mortality  
 
1.6% 0.7% 
1-year Readmission 
 
23.2% 31.5% 
Total cost 
 
22888 13223 
 [standard deviation] 
 
[11128] [7737] 
Length of stay 
 
8.270 3.109 
 [standard deviation] 
 
[3.986] [2.706] 
Gender(1=male) 59.0% 70.8% 65.8% 
Race Group 
   White 84.0% 86.1% 83.8% 
Black 10.0% 10.9% 11.5% 
Asian 5.8% 2.8% 4.4% 
Other races 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Age group 
   Age<=49 9.5% 6.7% 13.1% 
Age 50-59 17.5% 19.8% 23.2% 
Age 60-69 23.6% 31.1% 26.7% 
Age 70-79 29.7% 34.1% 27.0% 
Age 80+ 19.7% 8.3% 10.1% 
Major indications at admission 
   Cardiogenic shock 2.0% 1.5% 0.9% 
Hypertension 55.1% 61.3% 56.6% 
Dialysis 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 
Heart failure 19.2% 14.2% 8.6% 
Diabetes 27.2% 30.2% 24.9% 
Renal failure 4.4% 4.3% 1.7% 
AMI 40.4% 27.9% 40.5% 
Prior CABG 0.9% 0.1% 0.7% 
Prior PCI 1.2% 0.6% 1.3% 
Insurance type 
   Medicare 58.2% 52.9% 47.5% 
Medicaid 4.6% 3.5% 4.6% 
HMO 13.9% 16.5% 18.0% 
Fee-for-service 20.4% 24.5% 27.0% 
Emergency room admission 46.9% 19.7% 29.7% 
Transferred admission 16.0% 21.2% 22.6% 
Urban residence 71.1% 75.9% 75.5% 
HMO penetration rate at the county of residence  42.6% 42.3% 42.8% 
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Table 1-1 Descriptive Statistics for CAD, CABG and PCI Patient Samples (Cont’d) 
Illness severity 
   Charlson co-morbidity index (CCI)=0 23.6% 25.0% 26.7% 
CCI=1 36.1% 37.1% 43.0% 
CCI=2 23.4% 23.4% 20.6% 
CCI=3 11.1% 10.2% 6.9% 
CCI=4 3.7% 3.1% 1.9% 
CCI=5 1.1% 0.8% 0.5% 
CCI>=6 0.9% 0.4% 0.4% 
# of patients 580,255 105,438 219,006 
Notes: The CABG (PCI) samples are subsets of the CAD patient sample. It includes patients who 
are admitted to hospital with a new CAD diagnosis and underwent a CABG (PCI) procedure 
within 3 months after admission. In-hospital costs are in 1995 dollars. 
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Table 1-2 Descriptive Statistics on Cardiac Surgery Providers 
 
1997 2001 2004 
Mean travel distance 13.96 12.819 12.202 
[standard deviation] [7.489] [6.733] [7.636] 
CV of Charlson co-morbidity index 0.912 0.901 0.899 
[standard deviation] [0.071] [0.084] [0.082] 
CV of log(prior-year hospital expenditures) 0.096 0.096 0.1 
[standard deviation] [0.01] [0.013] [0.013] 
CV of log(in-hospital expenditures) 0.048 0.044 0.039 
[standard deviation] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] 
Not-for-profit 100% 98.3% 95.5% 
Bed size <200 10.2% 13.3% 16.7% 
Bed size 200-400 28.6% 45.0% 48.5% 
Bed size>400 61.2% 41.7% 34.8% 
Member of any health system 77.6% 73.3% 54.5% 
Teaching 61.2% 46.7% 37.9% 
COTH membership 40.8% 35.0% 27.3% 
Medicare share 18.4% 43.7% 45.3% 
No rating 8.2% 33.3% 10.6% 
Low rating 67.3% 5.0% 10.6% 
Medium rating 6.1% 56.7% 75.8% 
High rating 6.1% 5.0% 3.0% 
# of hospitals 48 59 66 
Note: Distances are measured as the straight-line distance between the geographic 
centroid of the zip code of a patient’s residence and the location of his or her 
admitting hospital. CV of Charlson co-morbidity index, prior-year expenditures, and 
in-hospital expenditures are aggregated from the patient samples. Not-for-profit 
status, bed size, health system membership, teaching status, and COTH membership 
are collected from the AHA annual survey data. Medicare share is calculated as the 
annual share of Medicare patients in all in-patient records. Hospital ratings are 
collected from Pennsylvania Cardiac Surgery Reports. Hospitals are matched to 
grades in the most recently published report. The study period includes five issues 
published in 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2004.  
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Table 1-3 Impact of Entry on Surgery Incidences 
 
CABG Surgery in 
3 Months 
PCI Surgery in 3 
Months 
CABG Surgery in 3 
Months at Any 
Incumbent Hospitals 
PCI Surgery in 3 
Months at Any 
Incumbent Hospitals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
A: Entrants defined as hospital in the market since 1997 
Effects of entrant share  
    10-25% 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.002 -0.015*** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] 
25%+ 0.026*** 0.034*** -0.019*** -0.058*** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] 
Observations 580,255 580,255 580,255 580,255 
R-squared 0.112 0.145 0.116 0.144 
 
B: Entrants defined as hospital in the market for 3 years or less 
Effects of entrant share  
    1-10% 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.007** 
 
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
10%+ 0.012*** 0.009*** -0.032*** -0.076*** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Observations 580,255 580,255 580,255 580,255 
R-squared 0.112 0.145 0.109 0.143 
Notes: All specifications include a set of patient characteristics reported in Table1-1 as well as zip-code fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. Entrant shares are estimated for CABG and PCI markets separately. Standard errors, adjusted for 
correlation in residents in the same zip-code area over time, are reported in brackets. *** p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 1-4 Impact of Entry on Surgery Incidences by Patient Illness Severity 
 
CABG Surgery in 
3 Months 
PCI Surgery in 3 
Months 
CABG Surgery in 3 
Months at Any 
Incumbent Hospitals 
PCI Surgery in 3 
Months at Any 
Incumbent Hospitals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
A: Entrants defined as hospital in the market since 1997 
High risk 0.029*** -0.059*** 0.023*** -0.065*** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Effects of entrant share  for high-risk patients 
  10-25% 0.027*** 0.001 0.012*** -0.011** 
 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] 
25%+ 0.041*** 0.019*** -0.005 -0.031*** 
 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] 
Effects of entrant share  for low-risk patients 
  10-25% 0.014*** 0.015*** -0.005 -0.018*** 
 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] 
25%+ 0.015*** 0.045*** -0.029*** -0.077*** 
 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] 
Observations 580,255 580,255 580,255 580,255 
R-squared 0.110 0.144 0.114 0.143 
 
B: Entrants defined as hospital in the market for 3 years or less 
High risk 0.028*** -0.066*** 0.025*** -0.069*** 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Effects of entrant share  for high-risk patients 
  1-10% 0.012*** 0.000 0.007* -0.006** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
10%+ 0.023*** 0.005* -0.019*** -0.057*** 
 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] 
Effects of entrant share  for low-risk patients 
  1-10% -0.002 0.003 -0.007** -0.007** 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
10%+ 0.005 0.011*** -0.040*** -0.089*** 
 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Observations 580,255 580,255 580,255 580,255 
R-squared 0.110 0.144 0.107 0.142 
Notes: All specifications include a set of patient characteristics reported in Table1-1 as well as zip-code fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. Entrant shares are estimated for CABG and PCI markets separately. Sick patients, 
defined as those with Charlson co-morbidity equal to or greater than 2, accounts for 40% of the sample. Standard 
errors, adjusted for correlation in residents in the same zip-code area over time, are reported in brackets. *** p<.01, 
**p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 1-5 Impact of Entry on Patient Surgery Outcomes 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Death Readmission log(length of 
stay) 
log (in-
hospital costs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: CABG patients   
 
 
High risk 0.006*** 0.095*** 0.074*** 0.046*** 
 
[0.001] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] 
Effects of entrant share  for high-risk patients 
   10-25% -0.004* -0.005 -0.018*** -0.019 
 
[0.002] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] 
25%+ -0.004 -0.003 -0.033*** -0.057*** 
 
[0.002] [0.008] [0.009] [0.015] 
Effects of entrant share  for low-risk patients 
   10-25% 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.012 
 
[0.002] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011] 
25%+ -0.003 0.003 -0.010 -0.049*** 
 
[0.002] [0.007] [0.007] [0.014] 
Observations 105,438 103,730 103,730 96,750 
R-squared 0.099 0.067 0.311 0.366 
     Panel B: PCI patients 
    High risk 0.002** 0.079*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 
 
[0.001] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] 
Effects of entrant share  for high-risk patients 
   10-25% -0.001 0.002 0.040*** -0.016 
 
[0.001] [0.006] [0.010] [0.012] 
25%+ 0.000 0.000 0.073*** -0.034** 
 
[0.001] [0.007] [0.013] [0.015] 
Effects of entrant share  for low-risk patients 
   10-25% -0.000 -0.004 0.021*** -0.008 
 
[0.001] [0.005] [0.007] [0.011] 
25%+ 0.000 0.003 0.053*** -0.035** 
 
[0.001] [0.005] [0.012] [0.015] 
Observations 174,600 173,381 173,381 161,976 
R-squared 0.116 0.052 0.439 0.295 
Notes: All specifications include a set of patient characteristics reported in Table1-1 as well as zip-code fixed 
effects, hospital fixed effects and year fixed effects. Sample sizes fall in readmission and length or stay 
regression due to exclusion of patients who died in hospital. Loss of observations in total costs regression is due 
to some hospitals having missing cost-to-charge ratio. Standard errors, adjusted for correlation in residents in 
the same zip-code area over time, are reported in brackets. *** p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 1-6 Impact of Entry on Hospital Outcomes 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES Mean of patients’ 
travelling distance 
CV of patients’ 
severity 
CV of patients’ prior-
year in-hospital 
expenditures 
CV of patients’ in-
hospital 
expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: CABG providers 
 
  
 10-25% -0.558 -0.018 0.003 -0.002*** 
 
[0.445] [0.013] [0.002] [0.001] 
25%+ -1.603** -0.024 -0.001 -0.003* 
 
[0.643] [0.026] [0.006] [0.002] 
Observations 456 455 447 456 
R-squared 0.953 0.349 0.288 0.629 
 
   
 Panel B: PCI providers 
    10-25% -0.719* -0.003 0.002 -0.002* 
 
[0.396] [0.015] [0.002] [0.001] 
25%+ -0.224 -0.005 0.003 -0.002 
 
[0.548] [0.032] [0.005] [0.002] 
Observations 467 467 464 467 
R-squared 0.956 0.447 0.306 0.619 
Notes: All specifications include a set of hospital characteristics reported in Table 1-2 as well as hospital fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted for correlation of the same hospital over time, are reported in brackets.  
*** p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 1-7 Monetary Value of Welfare Impacts from Free Entry 
 
Decrease in 
in-hospital 
mortality rate 
Increase 
in surgery 
demand 
Total 
benefits  
Decrease in 
surgery costs 
Fixed costs 
of entry 
Total costs 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
No market-expansion effect 
Upper-Bound $50 0 50 $61 $280 $219 
Lower-Bound $20 0 20 $46 $320 $274 
 
Consider market-expansion effect 
Upper-Bound $50 $1,514 $1,564 $61 $280 $219 
Lower-Bound $20 $4,361 $4,328 $46 $320 $274 
Notes: All values are in 2000 dollars and are in millions. 
  
49 
 
Figure 1-1 Number of Entrant CABG and PCI Programs from 1997 to 2004 
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Figure 1-2 Graphical Illustration of Entry Model without Market-expansion 
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Figure 1-3 Graphical Illustration of Entry Model with Market-expansion 
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Figure 1-4 CABG Surgery Rate among New CAD Patients 
 
 
Figure 1-5 PCI Surgery Rate among New CAD Patients 
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2 Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Use of Revascularization 
among Acute Myocardial Infarction Patients 
2.1 Background 
 There is an extensive literature documenting racial inequalities in the provision of 
cardiac procedures for patients with coronary artery disease.(Ayanian, Udvarhelyi, 
Gatsonis, Pashos, & Epstein, 1993; Barnato, Lucas, Staiger, Wennberg, & Chandra, 2005; 
Chen, Rathore, Radford, Wang, & Krumholz, 2001; Conigliaro, et al., 2000; Einbinder & 
Schulman, 2000; Ford & Cooper, 1995; Hannan, et al., 1999; Henry & the American 
College of Cardiology, 2008; Kressin & Petersen, 2001; Leape, Hilborne, Bell, Kamberg, 
& Brook, 1999; Peterson, et al., 1997; Schneider, et al., 2001; Sedlis, et al., 1997) These 
procedures include CABG, an intensive surgical intervention that involves isolating a 
section of vein or artery and grafting it to create a bypass of blockage in the coronary 
artery, and PCI, a less intensive procedure that involves a small incision through which a 
balloon is threaded and inflated to restore blood flow. While factors such as clinical 
presentations, income and insurance coverage play an important role, racial disparities 
still remain even when these factors are taken into account. For example, unequal 
treatments among minority Medicare beneficiaries are seen in all regions of the United 
States and have persisted over time. (Bertoni, et al., 2005) 
An alternative explanation is that disparities may be attributable, in part, to where 
patients live: the surgery rates among minority patients are lower because they tend to 
cluster in geographic areas with lower surgery rates for all racial groups. Previous studies 
using national samples found evidence that a large proportion of the national-level racial 
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differences in medical utilization and outcomes can be explained by the fact that minority 
populations are disproportionally distributed in the states that have lower use rate of 
procedures and more low-quality providers.(Baicker, Chandra, & Skinner, 2005; Skinner, 
Weinstein, Sporer, & Wennberg, 2003)  
Despite the findings on the significant variations of surgery rates across states, few 
studies have examined the variations in surgery rates at the local geographic level, for 
example, by county. Even fewer have explored whether racial disparities in surgery rates 
vary across counties. An empirical investigation of racial disparities at the county level is 
important because the likelihood to undergo a discretionary surgical procedure, such as a 
coronary revascularization procedure, is often influenced by local medical practice norms 
and payment environment, which may vary drastically across adjacent counties. Given 
the substantial heterogeneity of racial composition in each county, the state-level racial 
disparities in surgery rates may be misleading because of the differences in overall 
surgery rates across counties. For example, it is possible that minority patients are less 
likely to undergo surgeries within each county; however, such local differences may be 
offset at the state level because minority patients tend to cluster in urban counties with 
higher overall surgery rates.  
Geographic variation in medical utilization is commonly considered to reflect 
differences in local capacity of health care system and practice patterns of local health 
care providers. Previous research has shown that increased medical resource is associated 
with greater treatment intensity of chronic ill patients, particularly for end-of-life 
care.(Skinner & Wennberg, 2000; John E. Wennberg, 2004; J. E. Wennberg, Fisher, & 
Skinner, 2002) However, little is known about whether increased availability of medical 
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resource is associated with narrower racial disparities in use of cardiac surgical 
procedures. Are minority patients additionally disadvantageous compared with their 
white counterparts in areas with lack of medical resources?  
In this study, we offered an evaluation of the county-level variation in the 
relationship between race and surgery rates by analyzing the CABG and PCI surgery 
rates among Pennsylvania Medicare beneficiaries from 1995 to 2006. Specifically, we 
sought to address two questions: (1) To which extent can the state-level racial disparities 
in CABG and PCI surgery rates be explained by variations in surgery rates across 
counties? (2) Are the within-county racial disparities in surgery rates influence by local 
surgical capacity? 
 
2.2 Data and Sample 
This study performed a retrospective analysis using the administrative data from 
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4). The PHC4 collects 
detailed clinical and utilization information, such as diagnosis and procedure codes, 
diagnosis related groups (DRGs), and source of admission, for hospital discharges 
occurring in all Pennsylvania hospitals.  
The sample for this analysis comprised Medicare beneficiaries (patients with 
Medicare listed as the primary expected payer) admitted with a new primary diagnosis of 
AMI, defined as the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical 
Modification code of 410.xx, between 1995 and 2006. We focused on the Medicare 
population in order to eliminate the substantial heterogeneity in health insurance 
coverage that affects the likelihood of receiving surgeries. Patients who were admitted 
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with the same illness in the prior year or for subsequent episodes of care (ICD-9-CM 
410.x2) were excluded. This analysis was limited to AMI patients who resided in 
Pennsylvania, and who were Black or White. Other racial groups including Asian or 
Pacific Islander, Hispanic American Indian or Eskimo, and other or unknown race were 
excluded due to low numbers of observations. Collectively, these patients accounted for 
7.7% of all Pennsylvanian AMI patients.  
Patients were linked overtime via unique patient ID, which enabled us to identify 
the procedure use following the first AMI admission. The outcomes were the individual-
level use of CABG and PCI procedures within 3 months. Incidences of CAGB and PCI 
were analyzed as separate outcomes.  
Patient sociodemographic characteristics included gender, age group (<65, 65-75 
and >75), primary payer type (Medicare managed care plan, or others), secondary 
expected payer type (Medicaid, private insurance, or others), and log of median 
household income at the patient’s zip code of residence, which was obtained by linking 
patient zip code to the 2000 US Census. To adjust for patient illness severity and 
preexisting conditions, we included the count of comorbid conditions according to 
AHRQ Elixhauser comorbidity diagnostic categories(Elixhauser, Steiner, Harris, & 
Coffey, 1998; Rosen, et al., 2005) and dummy variables of major clinical indications 
affecting the quality of CABG/PCI procedures (hypertension, heart failure, cardiogenic 
shock, cancer, renal failure, other coronary artery diseases, history of CABG/PCI 
procedure).(Council, 2008) We also considered the source of admission: whether the 
patient was admitted from emergency department, and whether the patient was 
transferred from another health care facility (hospital, skilled nursing facility, 
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intermediate care facility, or assisted living facility); the reference group consisted of 
patients directly admitted to hospital.  
 
2.3 Methodologies 
The first hypothesis is that the observed disparities at the state level may be due to 
variation in surgery rates across the counties where patients live rather than the result of 
unequal treatment within local areas. We employed a two-level hierarchical model to test 
this hypothesis. The model can be described as follows: 
                                           
                  
                  
where               is a binary variable indicating whether a patient i living in 
county j in year t received cardiac surgery within 3 months after his or her initial 
admission of AMI,     is the county-specific intercept,         is an indicator for black 
patients,     is the county-specific effect of race on the probability of receiving surgery, 
   is a vector of coefficients for patient-level characteristics    ,    is the year-specific 
effects, and      is an independently, normally distributed error term.  
To explore how racial differences in surgery rates may be explained by county-
level factors, we modeled the intercept     for each county j as a function of the state-
level mean surgery rate    , the county-level surgical capacity   , and a county-level 
random term    . The random intercept     captures the between-county variation in 
surgery rate, and therefore enabled us to examine whether the observed racial differences 
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were attributable to the underlying surgery rates of each county. Similarly, we allowed 
the within-county racial difference     to vary by county-level surgical capacity    with a 
random term    . Identifying the coefficient     allowed us to test the second hypothesis 
that the likelihood of receiving surgery is influenced by the local surgical capacity. The 
variance of     was used to assess the heterogeneity in racial disparities across counties.  
We used the number of revascularization hospitals per 1000 AMI patients in each 
county as our main measure of local surgical capacity. We defined revascularization 
hospitals as those that performed at least 5 CABG or PCI procedures annually.(Cooke, 
Nallamothu, Kahn, Birkmeyer, & Iwashyna, 2011) Hospitals that performed PCI but did 
not perform CABG were also counted because such facilities represented for a nontrivial 
proportion of access to cardiac care services in nonurban areas.(Kutcher, et al., 2009) To 
detect any non-linear relationship between the surgical capacity and surgery rates, we 
coded the number of hospitals per capita into quintile categories. We then estimate a 
hierarchical model including a cross-level interaction between individual race group and 
the surgical capacity categorical variable. This specification allowed us to examine the 
extent to which black patients were better or worse off with the increase of local surgical 
capacity.  
We first performed linear regressions of CABG and PCI rates on race group, using 
year dummies to control for state-level time trend. The coefficient for the race categorical 
variable therefore identified the “raw” differences in surgery rates between blacks and 
whites. The standard errors were adjusted for clustering of patients within counties. Next, 
we estimated a richer specification that adjusted for heterogeneity in above-mentioned 
patient socioedemographics and clinical characteristics. We then sequentially estimated 
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two specifications of the above hierarchical model with and without the effects of county-
level healthcare capacity. Likelihood ratio tests were used to compare the fit of the 
hierarchical model over the linear regression model.  
 
2.4 Results 
Our study sample included 195,043(94.7%) white and 10,887(5.3%) black 
Medicare enrollees, who were initially hospitalized for AMI in 67 counties and 234 
hospitals between 1995 and 2006. Within three months of the admission, 9% of these 
patients underwent CABG procedure and 15.7% underwent PCI procedure (Table 2-1). 
The use rates of both CABG and PCI were lower among black patients. As compared 
with the proportion of white patients, a higher proportion of black patients were female, 
aged below 75, enrolled in Medicare managed care plans, and living in areas with lower 
median house household income. The black population represented a larger proportion of 
patients who were dual-eligible for Medicaid program, a finding that probably reflects a 
higher percentage of low-income Medicare enrollees among blacks. In regard to the 
admission source, black patients were more likely to be admitted through emergency 
department, while white patients were more likely to be transferred from other facilities. 
Despite the lower surgery rates, black patients were significantly sicker than white 
patients upon admission: they were more likely to have two or more comorbidities, and 
had higher rates of preexisting hypertension, congestive heart failure, diabetes, renal 
failure, and cancer.  
 Table 2-2 shows the use of CABG and PCI among blacks and whites in 10 
counties with the highest black population densities in study sample.  In 7 of the 10 
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counties, the rate of CABG within 3 months of initial AMI diagnosis was lower for 
blacks than for whites. In contrast, the rate of PCI within 3 months was not significantly 
different among blacks and whites in 7 of the 10 counties. In the remaining 3 counties, 
Philadelphia had PCI rate higher for blacks than for whites.  
Table 2-3 reports adjusted racial disparities in the use of CABG. Adjusted for year 
trend, the likelihood to undergo CABG was, on average, 3.2 percentage points (95% 
confidence interval (CI): -0.038 - -0.027), lower for blacks than for whites. Given that the 
time-adjusted average use rate of CABG was 9.1% among whites, this estimate means 
that blacks were 35.2% less likely to undergo CABG. Adjusting for patient characteristics 
significantly reduced such racial difference to 2.4 percentage points (95% CI: -0.034 - -
0.014), which amounts to 26.4% based on the risk-adjusted rate for whites. Men on 
average had higher CABG rate than women. Elderly Medicare patients were more likely 
to undergo CABG than those under 65. On the other hand, those who were above 75 had 
significant lower rate. Having Medicaid listed as the secondary expected payer was 
associated with lower CABG rate, possibly reflecting the fact that low-income senior 
patients who were dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid had limited access to 
care.(Grabowski, 2007) Patients transferred from other facilities were more likely to 
receive CABG, while patients admitted through emergency department were less likely to. 
Conditional on patient sociodemographic presentation, most of the clinical indications 
were significantly associated with the likelihood of surgery. Adjusting for county random 
effects further reduced the magnitude of disparity to 0.019 percentage points (95% CI: -
0.027 - -0.011), suggesting that blacks and whites in the same county were treated more 
similarly than would have been assumed based on state-level risk-adjusted difference. 
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The improvement in fit compared to the linear model was significant (χ2 = 613.54, p 
< .0001). This set of results indicates that black patients, on average, live in counties with 
lower CABG rates among both blacks and whites.  
In contrast, Table 2-4 shows that although the state-level racial disparity in PCI 
rates was almost fully explained by individual characteristics (-0.019 (-0.028 - -0.01) vs. 
0.002 ( -0.01 - 0.014)), further adjusting for the county-level variation increases the 
magnitude of racial disparity in PCI rates among AMI patients. Again, the likelihood 
ratio test indicates a better model fitting using county-specific random effects (χ2 = 
1702.15, p < .0001). These results suggest that, on average, blacks were less likely to 
undergo PCI than whites within the same county, but such difference was offset by the 
fact that blacks cluster in counties with relatively higher PCI rates among both blacks and 
whites.  
As shown in Table 2-5, local surgical capacity contributed to higher surgery rates 
for both racial groups and slightly reduced the gap between whites and blacks. Counties 
were stratified into five quintiles according to the surgical capacity, which is defined as 
the number of revascularization hospitals per 1000 AMI patients. Although the 
confidence interval for each of these categorical variables overlapped with each other, we 
focus on comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients in interpreting the results. 
Conditional on patient clinical and sociodemographic factors, those living in counties 
with the larger surgical capacity were more likely to undergo CABG and PCI. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that the effect of county-level surgical 
capacity on racial disparity was not linear; however, overall, increased surgical capacity 
was associated with lessened within-county racial difference in CABG and PCI rates.  
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For instance, all else being equal, black patients living in counties of the lowest surgical 
capacity (the first quintile) were 0.039 percentage points (95% CI: -0.065 - -0.013) less 
likely to undergo CABG and 0.042 percentage points (95% CI: -0.074 - -0.010) less 
likely to undergo CABG than their white counterparts, while blacks living in counties of 
the largest surgical capacity (the fifth quintile) were 0.023 percentage points (95% CI: -
0.034 - -0.011) less likely to undergo CABG and had equal PCI rates with white patients 
(point estimate: 0.009, 95% CI: -0.003 - 0.022).  
 
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
We performed sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of the findings. First, 
a small proportion (3% of all hospital-years) of revascularization facilities performed PCI 
but did not perform CABG. To reconcile the fact that these facilities did not actually 
provide meaningful capacity for potential CABG recipients, we repeated our cross-level 
analysis using an alternative definition of local surgical capacity that excluded these non-
CABG facilities. The results were consistent with the results obtained from our linear 
model.    
Second, we considered the number of hospitals treating AMI patients in each 
county as broader measure of healthcare capacity. Again, we stratified the data into five 
quintiles according to the number of AMI hospitals (treating at least 5 AMI cases during 
a year) per 1000 AMI patients. As shown in Table 2-6, increased number of AMI 
hospitals per capita was not associated with significantly greater likelihood to undergo 
CABG, nor was it associated with narrowed racial difference in CABG rates (i.e., the 
magnitudes of cross-level interaction effects did not show a decreasing trend across 
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quintile groups). Regarding the likelihood of undergoing PCI, counties in the lowest AMI 
hospital capacity had significantly lower PCI rates and larger racial difference between 
whites and blacks. Overall, these results suggest that the use of PCI procedure was more 
likely to be influenced by the availability of hospitals treating AMI patients.   
 
2.6 Discussion 
Persistent racial disparities are well recognized by policy makers and clinicians as a 
serious health system problem in need of correction. (Boler M, 2001; Geiger, 1996; John 
E. Wennberg, 2004) Using inpatient claims data of Medicare beneficiaries in from 1995 
to 2006, we show that because black and white populations tended to cluster in counties 
of distinct underlying treatment patterns, geographic variation may play an important role 
in the differential surgery use among black and white AMI patients. We also find positive 
association between greater surgical capacity and narrower racial disparities in CABG 
and PCI rates. 
Our findings that the state-level racial disparity in CABG procedure decreased, and 
in PCI procedure increased, with county adjustment indicate that blacks were more likely 
to live in counties with lower CABG rates and higher PCI rates for both black and white 
populations. These results are in agreement with earlier studies on the use of coronary 
interventions and other procedures such as knee arthroplasty and hip replacement, which 
documented wide variability of procedure use among racial groups both within and 
between regions.(Baicker, et al., 2005; Baicker, Chandra, Skinner, & Wennberg, 2004; 
Skinner, et al., 2003) More importantly, our study advances this literature by highlighting 
the importance to control for variation at smaller geographic units such as counties. Most 
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studies using national samples found that blacks tend to live in parts of the country that 
have higher share of low-quality providers or lower use rates, leading to the conclusion 
that minority groups are actually treated more similarly(Baicker, et al., 2005; Skinner, et 
al., 2003) within regions. Conversely, we demonstrate that black patients were on average 
less likely to undergo PCI procedures within counties, but such disparity was mitigated 
by the fact that blacks were more likely to cluster in urban areas of higher average rates 
of PCI. These results are consistent with Barnato et al., which shows that black patients 
tend to seek for care in hospitals with higher rates of cardiac surgical procedures.   
While racial differences in cardiac revascularization rates have been discussed in 
previous studies,(Baicker, et al., 2004; Barnato, et al., 2005; Rothenberg, Pearson, 
Zwanziger, & Mukamel, 2004; Schneider, et al., 2001) there has been little 
documentation of how local medical resources may influence these disparities. In this 
paper, we show that greater county-level surgical capacity contributes to narrowed local 
racial gaps in surgery rates, suggesting that consequences of inadequate medical 
resources may be particularly exacerbated for blacks, compared with whites.  There are 
several potential explanations for such finding. On the demand side, black patients living 
in counties with lower surgical capacity may not have sufficient knowledge about how to 
access the best care, or may be more reluctant to undergo intensive surgical procedures 
due to unfamiliarity to these procedures. (Ayanian, et al., 1993; Sedlis, et al., 1997) On 
the supply side, local surgical capacity may influence physician practice patterns in a way 
that race bias in physician referral (Schneider, et al., 2001; Schulman, et al., 1999) is 
more pronounced in counties with lower surgical capacity. Thus, the implication to health 
policy is that more efforts may be needed to strengthen referral services and to ensure 
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effective communication between patient and providers so that well-informed patients 
better participate in treatment decisions.  
Another implication of this analysis is that for discretionary surgical procedures, 
policy should not simply target on equalizing black rates with white rates. Instead, the 
objective depends critically on whether the racial gap stems from underuse among 
minorities or overuse among whites.(Hannan, et al., 1999; Peterson, et al., 1997; 
Schneider, et al., 2001) In this analysis, we find a positive association between greater 
local surgical capacity and higher surgery rates, which raises the concern of 
overutilization issues in areas with larger numbers of providers. Despite the American 
College of Cardiologists’ well-developed appropriateness classifications of CABG and 
PCI surgery, numerous studies have found inappropriate use of both CABG and PCI. 
(Hannan, et al., 1999; Schneider, et al., 2001) Particularly, Schneider, et al. shows that 
overuse is more likely among white population. These finding suggest that even with 
clinical decision-support guidelines, it is difficult to effectively reduce the overuse of 
cardiac surgical procedures without associated financial incentives. Therefore, current 
reform of payment system could strengthen the link between payment and effectiveness 
measures in order to ensure that inefficiencies in the treatment are reduced and 
appropriate care is provided.   
An important limitation of this analysis is our focus on Medicare beneficiaries. 
Although this approach greatly eliminates heterogeneity in health coverage among non-
Medicare patients, we are unable to ascertain the effects of geography on racial 
disparities among other populations. Others have suggested that patients with private 
insurance or under Medicaid program may face different levels of disparities in 
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care.(Hargraves & Hadley, 2003; Wenneker, Weissman, & Epstein, 1990) As well our 
findings can be generalized only to populations that are similar in their characteristics to 
those in Pennsylvania. Future research is needed to examine the replicatability our 
findings in other states or at the national level.  
The second limitation is that the inpatient claims data used for this analysis are 
collected primarily for billing purposes, and thus clinical detail and outcome measures 
are limited. While we attempt to control for patient comorbidities, our specification lacks 
measures of detailed medical history and laboratory results, which are used by physicians 
in making treatment decisions. Regarding health outcomes, we only observe in-hospital 
death, which accounts for a small proportion of short-term mortality of AMI patients. As 
a result we are not able to address larger issues about whether differential treatment is 
associated with adverse health outcomes among black patients.  
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Table 2-1 Descriptive Statistics by Race
a
 
  Total Whites Blacks   
  (n = 207,570)  (n = 195,043)  (n = 10,887) P Value
b
 
Dependent Variable 
    CABG within 3 months 9.0 9.1 5.8 < 0.0001 
PCI within 3 months 15.6 15.7 14.2 < 0.0001 
Patient demographics and clinical history 
    Male 48.3 48.6 42.6 < 0.0001 
Age 64-  8.1 7.6 16.9 < 0.0001 
Age 65 - 74 34.1 33.9 38.3 < 0.0001 
Age 75+ 57.8 58.5 44.8 < 0.0001 
Primary payer: Medicare managed care 16.2 15.8 23.2 < 0.0001 
Second payer: Medicaid 5.5 4.8 18.1 < 0.0001 
Second payer: private insurance 41.9 42.9 25.1 < 0.0001 
Mean log of household income
c
 (SE) 10.6 (0.30) 10.6 (0.29) 10.3 (0.36) < 0.0001 
Transferred admission 14.1 14.4 7.7 < 0.0001 
Emergency admission 72.1 71.7 80.5 < 0.0001 
Hypertension 43.8 43.1 55.4 < 0.0001 
Congestive heart failure 0.6 0.6 1.0 < 0.0001 
diabetes 26.6 26.2 34.4 < 0.0001 
Renal failure 5.8 5.4 11.9 < 0.0001 
cancer 2.6 2.6 3.4 < 0.0001 
Cardiogenic shock 4.7 4.8 3.7 < 0.0001 
Other coronary artery diseases 61.0 61.2 55.9 < 0.0001 
CABG 3.2 3.2 2.4 < 0.0001 
PTCA 4.5 4.5 3.8 < 0.0001 
Elixhauser 0 19.4 19.8 12.3 < 0.0001 
Elixhauser 1 33.6 33.8 29.5 < 0.0001 
Elihauser 2 28.1 28.0 30.9 < 0.0001 
Elihauser 3+ 18.8 18.4 27.3 < 0.0001 
Number of revascularization hospitals/1000 AMI patients 
   First quintile: 0 - 0.84 25.9 27.1 4.1 < 0.0001 
Second quintile: 0.85 - 2.03 14.2 14.6 6.3 < 0.0001 
Third quintile: 2.04 - 2.96 20.0 20.0 20.6 0.16 
Fourth quintile: 2.97 - 3.89 20.1 19.1 38.7 < 0.0001 
Fifth quintile: 3.90+ 19.8 19.2 30.3 < 0.0001 
Abbreviations: CABG, coronary artery bypass graft; PCI, percutaneous coronary intervention; SE, standard error. 
a
 Data are presented as percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
b
 t Tests. 
c
 Household income is abstracted at level of zip code. 
  
71 
 
Table 2-2 Use of CABG and PCI in Selected Counties, By Race 
  CABG within 3 months (%) PCI within 3 months (%) 
County White Black Difference White Black Difference 
Philadelphia 7.0 5.6 1.4
a
 12.3 13.4 -1.2
b
 
Dauphin 10.0 8.4 1.6 20.0 19.9 0.1 
Delaware 8.5 5.2 3.3
a
 13.3 11.2 2.1
c
 
Allegheny 9.3 6.2 3.1
a
 17.1 15.1 2.1
b
 
Chester 7.9 4.3 3.6
b
 15.9 16.2 -0.3 
Beaver 9.5 5.3 4.3
b
 22.0 16.3 5.7
b
 
Monroe 7.8 4.2 3.5
a
 15.1 13.6 1.5 
Erie 12.0 2.5 9.4
a
 17.2 16.9 0.3 
Mercer 7.1 6.4 0.7 15.7 15.4 0.3 
Washington 11.1 10.2 0.9 20.9 18.5 2.4 
a
p < 0.10; 
b
p < 0.05; 
c
p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 2-3 Factors Associated With CABG Use Within 3 Months Among Newly Diagnose AMI patients 
  Year Adjusted* + Patient Characteristics* + County Random Effects  
  Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Black -0.032
c
 (-0.038 - -0.027) -0.024
c
 (-0.034 - -0.014) -0.019
c
 (-0.027 - -0.011) 
Male 
  
0.029
c
 (0.025 - 0.032) 0.029
c
 (0.027 - 0.032) 
Age 65 - 74 
  
0.018
c
 (0.011 - 0.024) 0.018
c
 (0.013 - 0.022) 
Age 75+ 
  
-0.043
c
 (-0.050 - -0.036) -0.042
c
 (-0.047 - -0.037) 
Primary payer: Medicare 
managed care 
  
0.002 (-0.004 - 0.008) 0.004
b
 (0.000 - 0.008) 
Second payer: Medicaid 
  
-0.024
c
 (-0.033 - -0.014) -0.022
c
 (-0.028 - -0.017) 
Second payer: private 
insurance 
  
-0.002 (-0.011 - 0.008) -0.002 (-0.004 - 0.001) 
Log household income 
(zip code level) 
  
0.006 (-0.005 - 0.018) 0.005
a
 (-0.000 - 0.011) 
Transferred admission 
  
0.060
c
 (0.051 - 0.070) 0.061
c
 (0.057 - 0.066) 
Emergency admission 
  
-0.036
c
 (-0.045 - -0.028) -0.040
c
 (-0.044 - -0.037) 
Hypertension 
  
0.019
c
 (0.014 - 0.024) 0.019
c
 (0.016 - 0.022) 
Congestive heart failure 
  
-0.019 (-0.042 - 0.004) -0.021
b
 (-0.037 - -0.005) 
Diabetes 
  
-0.000 (-0.005 - 0.004) -0.000 (-0.003 - 0.003) 
Renal failure 
  
-0.015
c
 (-0.021 - -0.008) -0.016
c
 (-0.021 - -0.010) 
Cancer 
  
-0.038
c
 (-0.046 - -0.029) -0.037
c
 (-0.045 - -0.029) 
Cardiogenic shock 
  
0.012
b
 (0.002 - 0.022) 0.010
c
 (0.005 - 0.016) 
Other coronary artery 
diseases 
  
0.056
c
 (0.050 - 0.063) 0.055
c
 (0.052 - 0.057) 
Prior CABG 
  
-0.083
c
 (-0.090 - -0.077) -0.084
c
 (-0.091 - -0.078) 
Prior PTCA 
  
-0.043
c
 (-0.049 - -0.038) -0.044
c
 (-0.050 - -0.038) 
Elixhauser 1 
  
-0.000 (-0.004 - 0.004) -0.001 (-0.004 - 0.003) 
Elixhauser 2 
  
0.000 (-0.006 - 0.007) -0.001 (-0.005 - 0.004) 
Elixhauser 3+ 
  
-0.007 (-0.015 - 0.002) -0.008
c
 (-0.013 - -0.003) 
White, mean CABG use 
rate 0.091 (0.086 - 0.097) 0.091 (0.085 - 0.096) 0.084 (0.079 - 0.089) 
*Standard errors in the linear regression models are adjusted for correlation in patients living in the same county. 
a
p < 0.10; 
b
p < 0.05; 
c
p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 2-4 Factors Associated With PCI Use Within 3 Months Among Newly Diagnose AMI patients 
  Year Adjusted* + Patient Characteristics* + County Random Effects 
  Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Black -0.019
c
 (-0.028 - -0.010) 0.002 (-0.010 - 0.014) -0.011
a
 (-0.023 - 0.001) 
Male 
  
0.003
a
 (-0.000 - 0.007) 0.004
b
 (0.001 - 0.007) 
Age 65 - 74 
  
-0.027
c
 (-0.034 - -0.020) -0.029
c
 (-0.034 - -0.023) 
Age 75+ 
  
-0.115
c
 (-0.124 - -0.106) -0.116
c
 (-0.122 - -0.111) 
Primary payer: Medicare 
managed care 
  
0.007 (-0.011 - 0.025) 0.009
c
 (0.005 - 0.014) 
Second payer: Medicaid 
  
-0.030
c
 (-0.044 - -0.016) -0.024
c
 (-0.030 - -0.017) 
Second payer: private 
insurance 
  
0.004 (-0.012 - 0.020) 0.011
c
 (0.007 - 0.014) 
Log household income 
(zip code level) 
  
0.032
c
 (0.011 - 0.053) 0.013
c
 (0.006 - 0.020) 
Transferred admission 
  
0.069
c
 (0.052 - 0.085) 0.073
c
 (0.067 - 0.079) 
Emergency admission 
  
-0.046
c
 (-0.063 - -0.029) -0.051
c
 (-0.055 - -0.046) 
Hypertension 
  
0.056
c
 (0.051 - 0.061) 0.055
c
 (0.052 - 0.059) 
Congestive heart failure 
  
-0.063
c
 (-0.076 - -0.051) -0.067
c
 (-0.086 - -0.047) 
Diabetes 
  
-0.001 (-0.005 - 0.003) 0.000 (-0.004 - 0.004) 
Renal failure 
  
-0.058
c
 (-0.064 - -0.051) -0.061
c
 (-0.067 - -0.054) 
Cancer 
  
-0.018
c
 (-0.026 - -0.011) -0.017
c
 (-0.026 - -0.007) 
Cardiogenic shock 
  
-0.040
c
 (-0.053 - -0.028) -0.044
c
 (-0.051 - -0.037) 
Other coronary artery 
diseases 
  
0.103
c
 (0.093 - 0.113) 0.097
c
 (0.094 - 0.101) 
Prior CABG 
  
-0.029
c
 (-0.037 - -0.020) -0.030
c
 (-0.038 - -0.021) 
Prior PTCA 
  
0.065
c
 (0.052 - 0.077) 0.059
c
 (0.052 - 0.066) 
Elixhauser 1 
  
-0.051
c
 (-0.057 - -0.045) -0.052
c
 (-0.057 - -0.048) 
Elixhauser 2 
  
-0.085
c
 (-0.093 - -0.077) -0.087
c
 (-0.092 - -0.082) 
Elixhauser 3+ 
  
-0.115
c
 (-0.125 - -0.105) -0.117
c
 (-0.123 - -0.110) 
White, mean PTCA use 
rate 0.157 (0.145 - 0.168) 0.156 (0.146 - 0.166) 0.140 (0.131 - 0.150) 
*Standard errors in the linear regression models are adjusted for correlation in patients living in the same county. 
a
p < 0.10; 
b
p < 0.05; 
c
p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 2-5 Differences in CABG and PCI Use in Association With County-level Surgical Capacity  
  CABG Within 3 Months PCI Within 3 Months 
  Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Revascularization Hospitals Per Capita 
    First quintile -- -- -- -- 
Second quintile 0.011
c
 (0.003 - 0.019) 0.026
c
 (0.016 - 0.036) 
Third quintile 0.013
c
 (0.006 - 0.019) 0.029
c
 (0.021 - 0.038) 
Fourth quintile 0.015
c
 (0.009 - 0.022) 0.037
c
 (0.028 - 0.045) 
Fifth quintile 0.019
c
 (0.013 - 0.026) 0.038
c
 (0.030 - 0.047) 
Interaction Effect 
    Black, first quintile -0.039
c
 (-0.065 - -0.013) -0.042
c
 (-0.074 - -0.010) 
Black, second quintile -0.026
b
 (-0.048 - -0.004) -0.018 (-0.044 - 0.009) 
Black, third quintile -0.031
c
 (-0.044 - -0.018) -0.013
a
 (-0.028 - 0.002) 
Black, fourth quintile -0.024
c
 (-0.035 - -0.014) 0.005 (-0.007 - 0.016) 
Black, fifth quintile -0.023
c
 (-0.034 - -0.011) 0.009 (-0.003 - 0.022) 
a
p < 0.10; 
b
p < 0.05; 
c
p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 2-6 Sensitivity Analysis of County-level Surgical Capacity Using AMI Hospitals 
  CABG Within 3 Months PCI Within 3 Months 
  Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
AMI Hospitals Per Capita 
    First quintile -- -- -- -- 
Second quintile 0.001 (-0.003 - 0.006) 0.011
a
 (0.005 - 0.017) 
Third quintile 0.010
a
 (0.005 - 0.015) 0.011
a
 (0.005 - 0.018) 
Fourth quintile 0.004 (-0.002 - 0.010) 0.017
a
 (0.010 - 0.024) 
Fifth quintile 0.004 (-0.003 - 0.011) 0.012
b
 (0.003 - 0.020) 
Interaction Effect 
    Black, first quintile -0.018
b
 (-0.037 - 0.000) -0.027
b
 (-0.050 - -0.003) 
Black, second quintile -0.023
a
 (-0.037 - -0.010) -0.01 (-0.029 - 0.008) 
Black, third quintile -0.020
a
 (-0.032 - -0.008) -0.013 (-0.030 - 0.003) 
Black, fourth quintile -0.019
b
 (-0.034 - -0.004) 0.001 (-0.019 - 0.021) 
Black, fifth quintile -0.024
a
 (-0.039 - -0.010) -0.006 (-0.025 - 0.013) 
a
p < 0.10; 
b
p < 0.05; 
c
p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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3 The Relative Impacts of Hospital Volume and Surgeon Volume on 
Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Procedure 
3.1 Introduction 
Many studies have demonstrated the empirical evidence that higher hospital volume 
is associated with better patient outcomes for a wide range of procedures, including 
coronary angioplasty, coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG), carotid endarterectomy, 
and cancer surgeries (Birkmeyer, et al., 2002; Halm, Lee, & Chassin, 2002; Shahian & 
Normand, 2003). These findings have promoted several policy initiatives that encourage 
patients needing certain procedures to seek care at hospitals performing a larger volume 
of similar procedures. For example, the Leapfrog Group, a large coalition of private and 
public purchasers, has used hospital volume as a proxy of quality and as the basis for 
evidence-based hospital referral for several high-risk procedures (esophagectomy, 
pancreatectomy, coronary artery bypass graft, percutaneous coronary intervention, and 
abdominal aortic aneurysm repair). (Birkmeyer, Finlayson, & Birkmeyer, 2001) 
Despite the considerable body of literature, however, little is known about the 
mechanisms underlying the observed association between hospital volume and surgical 
outcomes. Because high-volume hospitals tend to be much larger facilities, they may 
have a broader range of specialist and technology-based services, better-staffed intensive 
care units, and other resources that are not available at smaller centers. As a consequence, 
high-volume hospitals may be better equipped to deliver complex high-risk surgical 
procedures. On the other hand, the outcome of a surgical procedure may also depend on 
how well the operation itself is performed. Thus an alternative explanation for the 
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observed relation between the hospital volume and the outcome is that high-volume 
hospitals tend to hire surgeons who are more experienced with specific procedures. 
Numerous studies have explored the associations between surgeon volume and mortality 
for various high-risk surgical procedures (Hannan, Siu, Kumar, Kilburn, & Chassin, 1995; 
Huckman & Pisano, 2006; Ramanarayanan, 2008). While these analyses have examined 
the role of surgeon volume in surgical quality, relatively few studies have simultaneously 
characterized the relative influence of hospital-level and surgeon-level volume with 
sufficient precision.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which the observed effects 
of hospital volume on outcomes can be explained by the experience of the operating 
surgeon of CABG procedure. CABG surgery was developed in the late 1960s and entered 
mainstream use in the United States during the 1970s. It is a risky and invasive procedure 
that involves surgically isolating a section of vein or artery and grafting it to create a 
bypass of blockage in the coronary artery. 
CABG surgery is selected for this analysis for several reasons. First, the procedure 
is frequently the focus of debate concerning the regionalization of health care services. 
The Leapfrog Group has recommended that payers contract with hospitals with an annual 
volume of CABG surgery procedures of at least 500. The American College of 
Cardiology recommends that hospitals with annual volumes of <100 be closely 
monitored (Eagle, et al., 1999). Given the considerable attention on the CABG surgery 
volume threshold, it is important to explore the factors which lead high-volume hospitals 
to provide better performance. Second, the past decades have witnessed a national trend 
of decreased case volume of CABG surgery, accompanied by an increase in the number 
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of hospitals providing CABG surgery (Epstein, Polsky, Yang, Yang, & Groeneveld, 
2011). Combined, these trends caused increasingly more patients to receive CABG 
surgery at hospitals with relatively low volumes of this procedure. Therefore, a revisit to 
the volume-outcome relationship for CABG helps to understand the potential adverse 
effects of decreasing hospital volume on surgical quality. Third, the extensive studies on 
this procedure have established a commonly accepted quality measure- in-hospital 
mortality, which is observed in the hospital administrative data used for this analysis.   
Using comprehensive inpatient claims data from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost 
Containment Council (PHC4), I find that patients treated at high-volume hospitals, on 
average, had lower in-hospital mortality than those treated at low-volume hospitals. 
However, such positive volume-outcome relationship can be fully explained by surgeon 
volume. That is, patients treated by high-volume surgeons have lower risk-adjusted 
mortality than those treated by low-volume surgeons, regardless of the volume of 
admission hospital. These results imply that the effects of hospital volume on surgical 
outcomes tend to be confounded by variation across surgeons. The policy implication of 
this study is that targeting on the CABG volume of operating surgeons could be an 
effective policy strategy to ensure surgical quality in low-volume CABG hospital. An 
implication beyond the CABG procedure is that for high-risk procedures, which require 
high technical skills and extensive use of specific intra-surgical processes, the experience 
of the operating surgeon rather than the admitting hospital could serve as a better 
predictor of the risk of death.  
 The rest of the paper has the following structure. The next section discusses the 
data used in the analysis. Section 3.3 presents the empirical framework. Section 3.4 
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presents the findings. Section 3.5 discusses the study’s implications and limitations.  
 
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The PHC4 data set identifies hospitals associated with each admission record, along 
with a wide range of patient-level information including age, race, gender, admission 
year and quarter, diagnosis/procedure codes, admission source, insurance type, zip code 
of residence, and discharge status. All patients admitted to Pennsylvania hospitals from 
1995 to 2004 with a primary procedure of coronary artery bypass (ICD-9 procedure 
codes 36.10-36.19) are initially included in the study sample. Through unique hospital 
identifier, the patient sample is linked with comprehensive hospital characteristics 
obtained from American Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey, which provides 
information such as hospital location, bed capacity, teaching status, ownership, and 
system member status.  
The study sample covers 163,462 CABG procedures performed by 845 surgeons at 
67 hospitals between 1995 and 2004. To characterize volume, I aggregate the discharge 
data to hospital- and surgeon- level, observing the total number of procedures that each 
hospital and each surgeon performed in each quarter during 1995 to 2004. Overall, 
approximately 50 percent of CABG surgeons operated at more than one hospital.  
In analyzing the surgery outcomes I exclude patients admitted to federal hospitals, 
osteopathic hospitals and long term hospitals because the patient mix and process of care 
in such facilities are usually different from those in general hospitals. In addition, I 
exclude CABG patients with hospital stays longer than 30 days and those who had a 
valve replaced simultaneously. These restrictions are intended to exclude small 
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subgroups of patients who had a much higher level of risk at base line and thus to 
minimize confounding. After losses due to these exclusions and incomplete information, 
there are 150,042 observations.  
Table 3-1 presents descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the analysis. 
The mean of dependent variable, patient mortality, is higher in high-volume hospitals 
(2.1%) than in low- and medium-volume hospitals (1.8%). This difference may be driven 
by the fact that high-volume hospitals attract a larger population of sick patients. As is 
shown in the table, high-volume hospitals treat relatively fewer patients with a Charlson 
co-morbidity index below 2 and more patients with a Charlson co-morbidity index 
greater than or equal to 2. There are negligible differences in gender, race and age 
between patients who received care from low-volume hospitals and those who received 
care from high-volume hospitals. The percentage of patients who are admitted through 
emergency department in low-volume hospitals is almost double of the percentage in 
high-volume hospitals, while the proportion of patients transferred from other facilities is 
significantly higher in high-volume hospitals. These patterns are suggestive of physician 
referring more patients to high-volume hospitals.  
Summary statistics for hospital characteristics are reported in Table 3-2, which 
shows that high-volume hospitals are much more likely than low-volume hospitals to be 
equipped with large bed capacity, more likely to be a member of some health system, and 
be identified as a teaching hospital.  
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3.3 Empirical Setting 
3.3.1 Calculation of the Risk-Adjusted Mortality Rate 
A commonly accepted measure of outcomes for CABG procedure is in-hospital 
mortality. However, observed mortality rates across hospitals and surgeons represent 
potentially-biased measures of the surgical quality, due to the heterogeneity in patients’ 
pre-surgical conditions. Specifically, high-quality hospitals and surgeons may attract 
patients with more severe forms of coronary disease, and these individuals are more 
likely to die in the hospital independent of provider quality.  
To adjust the binary mortality outcome for patient severity, I estimate logistic 
regression on the in-hospital mortality, controlling for several patient characteristics and 
existing clinical conditions (e.g., age, gender, complicated hypertension, heart failure, 
heart attack, kidney failure, cardiogenic shock, and others33) that could affect a patient’s 
underlying probability of dying in the hospital. The dependent variable in this regression, 
       , is an indicator equal to one if patient  , who received CABG from surgeon   at 
hospital  - died in the hospital, and zero otherwise. The form of this logistic regression is 
as following: 
 
   
       
         
       
          (9)  
where   
  is a vector of patient-level characteristics and clinical indications. I 
calculate the expected probability of death for each patient as the fitted value for that 
individual obtained from the logistic regression. That is,  
                                                          
33
 The selection of potential predictors for mortality follows the suggestions in the technical notes of 
Pennsylvania' Guide to Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery reports published by PHC4. The 
corresponding ICD-9 diagnosis and procedure codes for each indication can be found in these publications 
as well. 
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I estimate the expected mortality rate (      ) for each hospital   during a given 
quarter, by averaging the        across all patients at the same hospital. The risk-
adjusted mortality rate for a given hospital (      ) is then calculated as follows: 
 
       
     
     
        
where      , the observed mortality rate the hospital, is the share of patients who 
died in the hospital based on the total number of patient undergoing CABG procedures; 
and      is the average observed mortality rate for the entire state of Pennsylvania 
during that quarter. By multiplying     , the ratio of observed-to-expected mortality is 
normalized to the statewide average of CABG mortality. The risk-adjusted mortality rates 
at surgeon-level are calculated in the same method.  
 
3.3.2 The Relative Impacts of Surgeon and Hospital Volume 
Prior to test the relative influence of surgeon volume and hospital volume on 
patient's in-hospital mortality, I first establish the baseline relation between outcome and 
volume at hospital and surgeon levels separately. The basic logistic regression of patient 
mortality on hospital-level volume takes the following form: 
 
   
        
          
          
                           
   
        
              
(10)  
Again, the unit of analysis is patient and the dependent variable is an indicator for 
in-hospital death of patient i treated by surgeon s in hospital h at quarter t (t = 1, …, 40). 
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  is a vector of categorical variables that rank hospitals in order of increasing volume. 
I select cutoff points that most closely sort patients into three evenly sized groups with 
low, medium, and high hospital volume.   
  is a vector of patient-level characteristics and 
clinical indications. To capture the impact of hospital’s capacity- and technology-based 
resource on surgical outcome, I include     
 , a vector of hospital characteristics such as 
the number of staffed beds, teaching status, whether it is not-for-profit, and whether it 
belongs to any health care system34. To control for the fact that surgeons and hospitals 
have different underlying levels of quality independent of procedure volume, I include 
two additional variables: the risk-adjusted mortality rate of hospital and the risk-adjusted 
mortality rate of surgeon in the prior quarter (          and          ). Quarter fixed 
effects are included to capture the fact that the statewide CABG mortality declined during 
the sample period. To account for possible serial correlation over time within hospital, I 
allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix in the error structure within each 
hospital.  
Consistent with the findings of prior studies, the coefficient vector    is expected to 
be negative: an increase in a hospital’s procedure volume reduces its patient mortality, 
conditional on patient illness severity and hospital characteristics. Further, coefficients    
and    are expected to be positive: hospitals that performed better in the previous quarter 
should also perform better in the current period. In assessing the impact of surgeon 
volume on mortality, I reestimate model (10), replacing      
  with      
 , a vector of 
categorical variables indicating the group of low-, medium- and high-volume surgeons.  
                                                          
34
 Bed capacity is coded as two categorical variables: 200 to 400 beds and $>$400 beds; omitted group is 
$<$200 beds. Two binary measures of teaching status are used, one being whether the hospital has more 
than 20 full-time residents, and the other being whether the hospital is a member of Council of Teaching 
Hospitals and Health Systems (COTH). 
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Next, I test the hypothesis that some portion of the impact of hospital volume is 
attributable to surgeon's experience. Specifically, I estimate a variant of model (10) in 
which the influence of surgeon volume is taken into account and the impact of hospital 
volume is examined within each surgeon-volume cluster:  
 
   
        
          
                
 
   
      
          
   
                           
        
              
(11)  
According to the hypothesis that the negative relation between hospital volume and 
mortality is confounded by the experience of operating surgeon, the coefficients on 
hospital-volume categories within each surgeon-volume category(   ,    , and    ) 
would be expected to be smaller in absolute magnitude than coefficients     in model 
(10), or insignificantly different from zero. Analogous to the predictions with respect to 
model (10), the coefficient vector on surgeon volume,   , is expected to be negative.  
 
3.4 Results 
Figure 3-1 presents the relationship between volume and outcome in terms of 
patients’ mortality rates, adjusted for individual demographics, medical history and 
clinical indications. Surprisingly, the risk-adjusted mortality rates were higher in all three 
surgeon groups who operated in hospitals with the largest CABG quarterly volume (>149) 
than those who operated in hospitals with the lowest volume (<81), although the 
differences are not statistically significant (t-statistics between low-volume-hospital 
group and the other two groups are -0.9 and 1.37, respectively). Meanwhile, the risk-
adjusted mortality rates were significantly higher among surgeons performing less than 
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27 cases per quarter in each hospital volume category. Even within the high-volume 
hospital group, patients who received their surgery from low-volume surgeons have 
considerably higher mortality rates than those who received care from high-volume 
surgeons (2.82% vs. 2.15%).  
Table 3-3 reports the logistic regression results for the effects of hospital volume on 
the odds of death in hospital. Column 1 and 2 contain results from specification (10) 
which considers the overall impact of hospital volume without taking surgeon volume 
into account. The results suggest that an increase in a hospital’s quarterly CABG volume 
was associated with a reduction in risk-adjusted mortality. Adjusting for patient 
demographics and medical history, those being treated in hospitals with medium CABG 
volume (81-149 cases per quarter) were 12.4% less likely to die in hospital than those 
being treated in hospitals with low CABG volume (below 81 cases per quarter). However, 
there was not a significant difference in mortality rate between hospitals with low and 
high CABG volume (odds ratio=0.956, p-value = 0.682). The significance and magnitude 
of the coefficients remain after hospital fixed effects are included, suggesting that the 
negative coefficient was not driven by constant differences across hospitals. It is not 
surprising that in column 1 the coefficients for surgeon quality and hospital quality in the 
prior period are significantly positive, as surgeons and hospitals with worse outcomes in 
the prior quarter would be expected to have worse outcomes in the current period. On the 
other hand, once hospital fixed effects are included (column 2), hospital quality was 
negatively associated with in-hospital mortality (odds ratio = 0.169, p-value < 0.1), 
indicating a mean-reversion pattern at hospital-level. In particular, a hospital whose 
performance was under its own average in past quarter tended to improve its quality in 
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the current quarter.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3-3 present results from specification (11) which 
considers the impact of hospital volume on mortality while controlling for potentially 
confounding influence of surgeon volume. Again, the addition of hospital fixed effects 
does not substantially affect the estimation results. Both columns suggest that the impact 
of hospital volume drop in magnitude and significance once surgeon volume is controlled 
for. In fact, the coefficients of hospital-volume categories are insignificant in all three 
surgeon-volume clusters. These results are consistent with hypothesis that high-volume 
hospitals achieve better surgical outcomes not through hospital-level experience but by 
hiring more experienced surgeons. 
Applying the same analysis to surgeons, Table 3-4 shows the impact of surgeon 
volume without and with adjustment for hospital volume. Table 3-4 confirms that patient 
mortality rate significantly improves as the surgeon volume increases, and such effect 
exists across hospitals with varying volumes. Specifically, coefficients in column 3 and 4 
suggest that hospital volume along does not significantly influence mortality, while 
higher surgeon volume is strongly correlated with lower mortality within each hospital 
cluster. Overall, it is concluded that surgeon volume is a more important predictor for 
surgical mortality than hospital volume for CABG procedure.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to determine the relative impact of hospital and 
surgeon CABG volume on in-hospital mortality. Using comprehensive inpatient claims 
data from PHC4, this analysis shows that patients treated by high-volume surgeons have 
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lower risk-adjusted mortality than those treated by low-volume surgeons, regardless of 
the volume of admission hospital.  
While an association between hospital volume of CABG procedure and mortality 
has been found in numerous studies, it remains questionable whether hospital volume can 
be used as one of the quality indicators to be considered during the referral process. The 
results of this paper imply that surgeon volume play a more important role in risk of 
death for CABG procedure than hospital volume. Under the national trend of decreasing 
hospital CABG volumes, more attention should be paid on building the volume of 
operating surgeons with the goal of ensuring surgical quality in low-volume CABG 
hospital.  
Another implication beyond the CABG procedure is that for high-risk procedures, 
which require high technical skills and extensive use of specific intra-surgical processes, 
the experience of the operating surgeon rather than the admitting hospital could serve as a 
better predictor of the risk of death. This implication cautions against policies that 
attempt to regionalize procedures to a smaller number of hospitals (Ho, Town, & Heslin, 
2007; Plomondon, et al., 2006). Not only these policies may not achieve desired volume 
effects on outcomes, they are also likely to negatively affect outcomes by causing travel 
constraints and disrupt physician continuity of care.   
The study has several limitations. First, the outcome measure, in-hospital mortality, 
is defined as death before hospital discharge. However, since a large proportion of deaths 
occur after patients are discharged from hospital, in-hospital mortality along would not 
adequately reflect the true quality of surgery. Second, the RAMR is not a statistically 
robust measure for surgeons and hospitals with very low volume (fewer than 5 cases). 
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For example, there is a higher likelihood for a surgeon who performed only one case to 
receive a low RAMR (0%) than for a surgeon who performed more than fifty cases. 
However, that is not enough to suggest that the former is of better quality than the latter. 
Third, the study at this stage only identifies the correlation, rather than causal relationship 
between surgeon volume and surgical outcome. However, as discussed extensively in the 
health care literature, the positive correlation between health outcomes and provider 
volume may be due to a referral system that directs more patients to high quality 
providers.  
In line with this research I will look for approaches that measure surgeons’ and 
hospitals’ quality more precisely, especially for providers with extremely low caseload. 
Another direction is to find some exogenous shock to providers' volume and use that as 
an instrumental variable to identify the causal relationship between volume and outcome. 
Finally, it is interesting to expand this study to other aspects of surgical quality such as 
the 3-month readmission and the length of stay, since hospital-based service (e.g. 
intensive care, pain management, respiratory care, and nursing care) may be beneficial in 
terms of relatively longer-term health outcome.
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Table 3-1 Characteristics of Patients, According to Hospital Volume 
 
Low-Volume 
Hospitals 
Medium-Volume 
Hospitals 
High-Volume 
Hospitals 
In-hospital mortality 1.8% 1.8% 2.1% 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Gender(1=male) 70.3% 69.7% 69.4% 
Race Group 
   White 10.9% 11.4% 9.0% 
Black 84.7% 86.4% 87.8% 
Asian 4.0% 2.1% 3.0% 
Other races 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 
Age group 
   Age<=49 7.1% 7.8% 7.3% 
Age 50-59 20.2% 19.9% 18.8% 
Age 60-69 30.8% 31.3% 32.3% 
Age 70-79 33.4% 33.4% 34.2% 
Age 80+ 8.6% 7.6% 7.4% 
Cardiogenic Shock 1.3% 1.4% 1.9% 
Hypertension 61.7% 58.3% 57.5% 
Dialysis 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 
Heart failure 15.2% 13.8% 16.2% 
Diabetes 31.2% 29.6% 29.3% 
Renal failure 4.3% 4.2% 4.0% 
AMI 26.8% 28.7% 27.5% 
Concurrent Valve 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 
Insurance type 
   Medicare 51.5% 52.8% 54.2% 
Medicaid 4.4% 3.6% 3.0% 
HMO 14.8% 14.9% 12.9% 
Fee-for-service 25.8% 24.9% 25.9% 
Emergency room admission 24.8% 18.3% 12.3% 
Transferred admission 16.4% 25.1% 29.0% 
Urban residence 71.7% 73.6% 80.1% 
Healthiness Index 
   Charlson co-morbidity 
index(CCI)=0 21.5% 21.1% 20.3% 
CCI=1 33.0% 33.4% 32.7% 
CCI=2 23.0% 23.4% 23.7% 
CCI=3 12.9% 12.4% 12.8% 
CCI=4 5.4% 5.5% 5.9% 
CCI=5 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 
CCI>=6 1.9% 1.8% 2.2% 
    Number of observations 52759 52189 52016 
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Table 3-2 Characteristics of Hospitals, According to Hospital Volume 
 
Low-Volume 
Hospitals 
Medium-Volume 
Hospitals 
High-Volume 
Hospitals 
    Non-for-profit 98% 100% 100% 
Bed size <200 18% 6% 0% 
Bed size 200-400 51% 32% 9% 
Bed size>400 31% 62% 91% 
Member of any health 
system 40% 58% 87% 
Teaching 28% 40% 70% 
COTH membership 68% 83% 89% 
Medicare share 42% 40% 41% 
(standard deviation) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) 
    Number of observations 1333 506 294 
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Table 3-3 Association Between Hospital Volume and In-hospital Mortality
a
 
Overall impact of hospital volume 
    Medium Hospital volume 0.876* 0.857* 
  
 
[0.062] [0.078] 
  High Hospital volume 0.956 0.948 
  
 
[0.089] [0.100] 
  Overall Impact of surgeon volume 
    Medium surgeon volume 
  
0.769*** 0.754*** 
   
[0.072] [0.062] 
High Hospital volume 
  
0.760* 0.800* 
   
[0.126] [0.095] 
Impact of hospital volume among low-volume surgeons 
    Medium Hospital volume 
  
0.874 0.879 
   
[0.079] [0.110] 
High Hospital volume 
  
1.049 1.034 
   
[0.117] [0.143] 
Impact of hospital volume among medium-volume surgeons 
    Medium Hospital volume 
  
0.938 0.940 
   
[0.118] [0.106] 
High Hospital volume 
  
1.052 1.088 
   
[0.157] [0.172] 
Impact of hospital volume among high-volume surgeons 
    Medium Hospital volume 
  
0.981 0.878 
   
[0.164] [0.122] 
High Hospital volume 
  
0.986 0.968 
   
[0.173] [0.141] 
Hospital RAMR, prior quarter 13.982** 0.169* 11.119** 0.170* 
 
[15.194] [0.170] [11.608] [0.170] 
Surgeon RAMR, prior quarter 2.123*** 1.917** 2.004*** 1.850** 
 
[0.603] [0.567] [0.536] [0.520] 
     Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Hospital fixed effects N Y N Y 
Standard errors clustered by hospital N Y N Y 
     Observations 150042 150042 150042 150042 
a
 Coefficients are report as odds ratio. 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p< 0.01. 
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Table 3-4 Association Between Surgeon Volume and In-hospital Mortality
a
 
Overall impact of Surgeon volume         
Medium Surgeon volume 0.780*** 0.782*** 
  
 
[0.044] [0.043] 
  High Surgeon volume 0.764*** 0.772*** 
  
 
[0.045] [0.048] 
  Overall Impact of hospital volume 
    Medium hospital volume 
  
0.874 0.879 
   
[0.079] [0.110] 
High Hospital volume 
  
1.049 1.034 
   
[0.117] [0.143] 
Impact of surgeon volume in low-volume hospitals 
    Medium Surgeon volume 
  
0.769*** 0.754*** 
   
[0.072] [0.062] 
High Surgeon volume 
  
0.760* 0.800* 
   
[0.126] [0.095] 
Impact of hospital volume in medium-volume hospitals 
    Medium Surgeon volume 
  
0.825** 0.806** 
   
[0.069] [0.073] 
High Surgeon volume 
  
0.853 0.800* 
   
[0.085] [0.091] 
Impact of hospital volume in high-volume hospitals 
    Medium Surgeon volume 
  
0.771** 0.793* 
   
[0.093] [0.096] 
High Surgeon volume 
  
0.714*** 0.749*** 
   
[0.054] [0.063] 
Hospital RAMR, prior quarter 12.647** 0.187* 11.119** 0.170* 
 
[13.746] [0.188] [11.608] [0.170] 
Surgeon RAMR, prior quarter 2.024*** 1.851** 2.004*** 1.850** 
 
[0.544] [0.521] [0.536] [0.520] 
     Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Hospital fixed effects N Y N Y 
Standard errors clustered by hospital N Y N Y 
     Observations 150042 150042 150042 150042 
a
 Coefficients are report as odds ratio 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p< 0.01 
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Figure 3-1 Patient Risk-adjusted Mortality Rates by Hospital and Surgeon Volume Category 
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